Restorative Justice for Multinational Corporations by Spalding, Andrew Brady
 
Restorative Justice for 
Multinational Corporations 
ANDREW BRADY SPALDING* 
Deterrence theory, rooted in the methodology of law and economics, 
continues to dominate both the theory and practice of white-collar crime. By 
manipulating the disincentives of prospective wrongdoers, deterrence aims to 
efficiently reduce crime and maximize taxpayers’ utility. However, the rise of 
international commerce presents a challenge it cannot meet. Using a 
combination of empirical evidence and quantitative modeling, this Article 
shows that deterrence will tend to increase, rather than decrease, net levels 
of corporate crime in developing countries.  
The ever-increasing power of multinational corporations thus calls for a new 
theory of punishment, one that uses criminal enforcement to address the 
systemic causes of crime. That theory, quite ironically, is restorative justice. 
By involving the perpetrator, victim, and community in the sentencing 
process, restorative justice does not merely punish the wrongdoer, but 
remedies the harm caused by the crime, prevents future harm, and 
reintegrates the defendant into the very community it violated. Though 
generally thought to apply only to the traditional crimes of natural persons, 
this Article demonstrates that the U.S. Constitution and Sentencing 
Guidelines already authorize corporate sentencing practices rooted in 
restorative justice principles. More to the point, for two decades the U.S. 
Department of Justice has quietly been implementing restorative justice 
principles in domestic white-collar environmental sentencing. Drawing on 
those precedents, this Article builds a model for extraterritorial white-collar 
criminal punishment that advances the interests of U.S. corporations and 
enforcement agencies alike, benefits the overseas victims of corporate crime, 
and requires no new legal authorization to implement. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A multinational corporation (MNC) with a U.S. nexus commits a white-
collar crime overseas. Perhaps it bribes foreign officials for business purposes, 
or willfully violates trade sanctions; either way, it knowingly profits from the 
illegal exploitation of relatively weak foreign governments. The U.S. 
Department of Justice imposes a criminal fine in the tens or hundreds of 
millions of dollars, and publicly touts the achievement.1 But where does that 
money go?  
Those millions are deposited directly in the U.S. treasury,2 where they 
finance U.S. government programs and reduce the federal deficit. But the 
principal victims of that crime—the citizens of the government whose 
weakness the MNC exploited for personal gain—are scarcely helped at all. 
Owing to a peculiar but inherent quirk in extraterritorial white-collar criminal 
law, enforcement revenues accrue only to the perpetrator’s public fisc.  
                                                                                                                     
 1 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Alcoa World Alumina Agrees to 
Plead Guilty to Foreign Bribery and Pay $223 Million in Fines and Forfeiture (Jan. 9, 
2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/January/14-crm-019.html, archived 
at http://perma.cc/CRQ8-CHFH (“The law does not permit companies to avoid 
responsibility for foreign corruption by outsourcing bribery to their agents, and, as today’s 
prosecution demonstrates, neither will the Department of Justice.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries 
Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in 
Combined Criminal Fines (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr 
/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html, archived at http://perma.cc/WVV7-WEVZ (“The 
[government] will continue to . . . ensure that the corporate and business communities are 
not tarnished with violations of the kind we are presenting here today.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 2 See 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) (2012). 
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We may seek consolation in the doctrine of general deterrence, the 
supposed “holy grail” of criminal punishment.3 By this logic, though the 
penalty money sits in U.S. coffers, it deters prospective violators from further 
criminal conduct.4 The problem is that it will not work. 
 However effective deterrence may (or may not) be in reducing crime 
domestically,5 in extraterritorial white-collar enforcement it is doomed to fail: 
it will tend to increase net crime levels in the very countries whose social 
conditions we seek to improve. If our goal is to reduce crime—and it often 
is6—we therefore need an alternative theory of criminal punishment; one that 
can better address the conditions of international commerce than deterrence 
ever could.  
This Article provides that theory. Quite ironically, it is restorative justice: 
an approach to criminal punishment whereby the victims, community, and 
perpetrator all participate in diagnosing the causes of the criminal act, 
determining the appropriate punishment, and seeking the defendant’s 
reintegration into the very community whose norms it once violated.7 And to 
those who may retort that restorative justice does not and could not apply to 
large-scale corporate crime, my answer may be surprising: it already does. The 
“Sentencing of Organizations” chapter of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (the 
Guidelines)8 authorizes, if not encourages, sentencing procedures founded on 
restorative justice principles. Moreover, federal sentencing practices do now, 
and have for several decades, applied those principles to a specific area of 
federal white-collar enforcement: domestic environmental law.9 The only 
remaining task is to adapt this practice to extraterritorial white-collar 
enforcement.10  
Accordingly, Part II explains deterrence theory, its grounding in the 
methodology of law and economics, and its status as the dominant 
contemporary theory of criminal punishment. It then proposes using anti-
                                                                                                                     
 3 Patrick J. Keenan, The New Deterrence: Crime and Policy in the Age of 
Globalization, 91 IOWA L. REV. 505, 515 (2006).  
 4 See, e.g., John Bronsteen et al., Happiness and Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1037, 1039 (2009); Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence’s Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385, 
2386 (1997); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public 
Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 45 (2000); George J. Stigler, The 
Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 526 (1970). 
 5 See, e.g., Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal 
Deterrence?, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 766 (2010). 
 6 See infra Part II.B. 
 7 See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & RESPONSIVE REGULATION 
11 (2002); UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, HANDBOOK ON RESTORATIVE 
JUSTICE PROGRAMMES 6 (2006), available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_ 
justice/06-56290_Ebook.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8FDC-3DS5. 
 8 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (2014).  
 9 See infra Part IV.A. 
 10 See infra Part IV.C. 
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bribery law, particularly the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,11 as a kind of 
case study in federal extraterritorial deterrence, and explains why the FCPA 
serves this purpose well.12 Using empirical evidence on the FCPA’s impact 
overseas, Part III builds a model to show why deterrence will tend to fail more 
generally in extraterritorial white-collar enforcement. It explains the unique 
conditions of international business and illustrates how these conditions will 
often produce an increase, rather than a decrease, in overseas crime. Part IV 
then shows restorative justice to be a superior, if counterintuitive, paradigm for 
extraterritorial white-collar enforcement. It develops a new sentencing 
procedure that would promote the interests of the federal enforcement 
agencies, help the overseas victims of corporate crime, and require no new 
legal authorization to implement. 
II. DETERRENCE THEORY, PURE AND PROUD 
Modern deterrence theory, with its underpinnings in law and economics, 
posits a rational enforcement authority that manipulates the cost-benefit trade-
offs for prospective offenders to efficiently reduce crime. This section shows 
how the theory has remained largely unscathed despite two lines of potential 
criticism. It then introduces anti-bribery law as a case study in extraterritorial 
white-collar deterrence that illustrates deterrence’s unintended and troubling 
consequences in foreign jurisdictions.  
A. Law and Economics’ Rational Enforcement Authority 
The watershed work on public law enforcement in the law and economics 
paradigm is A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell’s The Economic Theory 
of the Public Enforcement of Law.13 They explain that to the law and 
economics way of thinking, social welfare generally is presumed to equal the 
sum of individuals’ expected utilities. An individual’s expected utility 
essentially depends on four variables: whether she commits a harmful act, 
whether she is sanctioned (by fine, imprisonment, or both), whether she is a 
                                                                                                                     
 11 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA), Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494, 
amended by Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 
Stat. 1107 and by International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. 
No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 12 This Article is the culmination of a long-term research project exploring the impact 
of federal business law generally, and anti-bribery law specifically, on developing 
countries. Previous installments include the following: Andrew Brady Spalding, 
Corruption, Corporations, and the New Human Right, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1365 (2014) 
[hereinafter Spalding, Corruption]; Andrew Brady Spalding, The Irony of International 
Business Law: U.S. Progressivism and China’s New Laissez-Faire, 59 UCLA L. REV. 354 
(2011) [hereinafter Spalding, The Irony]; Andrew Brady Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions: 
Understanding Anti-Bribery Legislation as Economic Sanctions Against Emerging 
Markets, 62 FLA. L. REV. 351 (2010) [hereinafter Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions].  
 13 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 4. 
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victim of someone else’s harmful act, and on her tax payment (which will 
reflect the costs of law enforcement, less any fine revenue collected).14  
The individual thus wears two hats in the utility calculation: as potential 
wrongdoer, and as potential victim. The potential victim’s two variables—
whether she is a victim and the extent of her taxes—are of course closely 
interconnected. Recognizing her potential victimization, she pays taxes to 
prevent it. The purpose of funding crime enforcement with her own taxes, 
then, is to prevent the disutility of victimization. The paradigm thus assumes 
that we pay taxes to increase our individual utility; were there no threat of 
victimization, the individual would have no reason to pay taxes. There’d be no 
utility in it; not faced with the threatened disutility of falling victim, her utility 
would not be maximized by paying taxes to finance public criminal law 
enforcement. The potential victims are taxpayers; the taxpayers are potential 
victims.  
The “enforcement authority’s problem” then is to maximize social welfare 
by finding the most efficient combination of the four key enforcement 
variables mentioned above: enforcement expenditures, the level of the fine, the 
length of imprisonment, and the standard for imposing liability.15 The 
disutility of crime is weighed against the cost of prevention, and the aim is to 
reduce crime with maximal cost-efficiency. The enforcement authority should 
expend only so much on enforcement as is necessary to reduce the disutility 
for the taxpayer. 
Following Cesare Beccaria’s admonition that it is “better to prevent crimes 
than to punish them,”16 law and economics seeks to deter crime by ensuring 
that the cost of punishment to a potential wrongdoer exceeds the rewards.17 
The core assumption of deterrence is that potential wrongdoers will decide 
against the commission of a criminal act based on the fear of sanctions or 
punishment.18 It assumes that the potential (and perhaps hypothetical) 
wrongdoer calculates the utility of crime based on the benefits and costs of the 
criminal act as well as the benefits and costs of abstaining. The attributes of 
punishment that can be manipulated to maintain the proper cost-benefit ratio 
are its certainty, severity, and celerity (or swiftness).19 If set appropriately, the 
potential violator will succumb to deterrence because a rational choice would 
never result in the commission of a crime; the cost would prove too high in 
                                                                                                                     
 14 Id. at 48.  
 15 Id. at 48–49. 
 16 See CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 93 (Henry Paolucci trans., 
Bobbs-Merrill Educ. Publ’g 1963) (1764).  
 17 GEORGE B. VOLD ET AL., THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 196–97 (5th ed. 2002). 
 18 Paternoster, supra note 5, at 766. 
 19 Id. at 783. 
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comparison to the perceived benefit.20 Punishment is said to have a deterrent 
effect when the fear or actual imposition of punishment leads to conformity.21  
The paradigm remains largely unfazed by the potential problem of 
criminal overdeterrence. In civil law, by contrast, the cost of overdeterrence is 
well-recognized:22 if the penalty for causing a car accident were $1 million, 
people would cease driving.23 But for the kinds of intentional acts generally 
proscribed by criminal law, the risk of discouraging socially productive 
behavior, or of encouraging destructive behavior, is negligible. Because the 
goal is to achieve effective deterrence by setting punishment at a sufficiently 
high level to dissuade potential offenders, the “temptation to impose 
increasingly harsher penalties is strong.”24 The optimal level of intentional (as 
opposed to negligent) criminal conduct, generally speaking, is therefore zero. 
But scholars have, perhaps somewhat indirectly, addressed the problem of 
overdeterrence in two ways. These concern the risk that deterring a particular 
crime might increase the incidence of other crimes. The first is the problem of 
marginal deterrence: setting equally high penalties for crimes of unequal 
severity will tend to encourage the more severe crime. As George Stigler 
famously put it, “If the thief has his hand cut off for taking five dollars, he had 
just as well take $5,000.”25 Where the overall level of criminality might be 
understood as the number of crimes committed multiplied by their severity, 
disproportionate penalties for relatively mild criminal acts will remove the 
disincentive to engage in more serious crimes and thus increase overall levels 
of criminality. 
The second is based on Neal Katyal’s research on substitution. Katyal held 
that the public enforcement agency must consider how penalizing a given 
crime may increase the appeal of alternative, or substitute, crimes. An increase 
in the “price” of one crime may cause potential wrongdoers to substitute 
criminal act X with criminal act Y or Z.26 Accordingly, though enforcing the 
prohibition on X may well deter X, it may also increase the incidence of Y or 
Z.27 For both of these problems, the effort to deter a given crime has produced 
                                                                                                                     
 20 See VOLD ET AL., supra note 17, at 196. 
 21 TERANCE D. MIETHE & HONG LU, PUNISHMENT: A COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 20 (2005).  
 22 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.10 (8th ed. 2011) 
(describing the theory of optimal tort damages). For a discussion of civil punitive damages 
that violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416–28 (2003). 
 23 Bronsteen et al., supra note 4, at 1056 n.100. 
 24 Id. at 1055–56. The overdeterrence problem can arise with negligence crimes; 
negligent vehicular homicide would raise the same overdeterrence problems as the civil 
example above, such that the optimal level of such homicides may be greater than zero. 
 25 Stigler, supra note 4, at 527. 
 26 Katyal, supra note 4, at 2387. 
 27 The enforcement authority’s inclination to inflict an increasingly severe punishment 
may be further restrained in two ways. First, the enforcement costs must be no greater than 
is necessary to achieve the optimal level of deterrence. These costs would take two forms. 
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the collateral harm of an increase in another form of crime. But scholarship on 
the substitution problem, like marginal deterrence, would hardly constitute an 
attack on the essential theory.  
Scholars have gained somewhat more traction attacking the practice of 
deterrence. The core theory has given rise to a number of hypotheses that 
empiricists continue to test. Questions remain concerning to what extent an 
increase in the objective costs of punishment to a potential wrongdoer, 
particularly length of sentence, will decrease the incidence of crime; to what 
extent increasing enforcement resources will increase certainty and celerity; 
and whether objective increases in certainty, severity, or celerity will produce 
a proportional increase in the subjective perceptions of those attributes among 
wrongdoers and therefore exert a downward push on crime, etc.28  
But note that these are questions of degree; while we do not know whether 
deterrence “works very well,”29 we know it works. The empirical evidence 
indeed demonstrates that deterrence measures succeed—however 
imperfectly—in reducing crime. Actors subject to the jurisdiction of a law that 
penalizes a given form of conduct with the requisite degree of certainty, 
severity, and celerity will engage in less of that conduct. We know this, and 
we might call it the upside of deterrence.  
And notice the corollary: if we know that actors subject to a criminal 
prohibition will engage in less of that conduct, we also know that actors not so 
subject will engage in more of it. Applied to white-collar enforcement, 
companies subject to the criminal prohibition on a particular form of profitable 
but socially undesirable conduct will engage in less of that conduct than 
companies that are not so subject; companies not subject to that prohibition 
will engage, relatively speaking, in more of that conduct. This is the downside 
of deterrence’s upside. To clarify, what I am here calling the downside is not a 
consequence of its upside; it is merely a logical corollary that will prove 
important in the analysis below. And in international business, governed by 
the extraterritorial application of criminal laws, where the law’s stated object 
is to deter overseas crime, the downside proves tricky.  
                                                                                                                     
Most obvious are the costs of detecting, trying, and imprisoning a criminal, which are of 
course substantial. Bronsteen et al., supra note 4, at 1056–57. Under the logic of 
deterrence, they cannot become excessively so, lest the taxpayers’ disutility exceeds the 
risk of victimization. Id. But additionally, society incurs the opportunity cost of removing 
potentially productive individuals from society through imprisonment, a factor that is (from 
a narrowly economic perspective) especially pronounced in white-collar crime. Id. In 
addition to these social costs, utilitarianism would value the welfare (though not the rights) 
of the defendant; he need not suffer any greater a punishment than is necessary for 
deterrence purposes. Id. 
 28 See Paternoster, supra note 5, at 787–818. 
 29 Id. at 766; see DAVID M. KENNEDY, DETERRENCE AND CRIME PREVENTION: 
RECONSIDERING THE PROSPECT OF SANCTION 9 (2009). 
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B. A Case Study in Extraterritorial Deterrence: Anti-Bribery Law 
For three reasons, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act30 is well-suited to 
illustrate the unanticipated consequences of extraterritorial white-collar 
enforcement. First, it is perhaps the clearest case of a federal statute 
criminalizing extraterritorial white-collar conduct that, by all indications, 
Congress intended as a tool for improving overseas legal institutions. I have 
made that argument elsewhere at some length,31 and will only summarize it 
briefly here.  
The legislative history makes abundantly clear that Congress sought to 
increase transparency specifically and improve market conditions generally in 
developing countries through the FCPA. Congressional deliberations on the 
need for an extraterritorial anti-bribery statute in the 1970s were initially 
precipitated by the discovery that the Lockheed Corporation, the flagship U.S. 
defense contractor, had paid bribes to government officials in Japan, the 
Netherlands, and Italy to win bids.32  
Each of these countries was thought critical to the growth of democratic 
institutions, and revelations of corporate bribery undermined liberalism’s 
credibility. Congressman Stephen Solarz, a Democrat from New York, argued 
in Congress that Lockheed’s payments to Japanese officials put “‘[t]he 
democratic system in Japan . . . in grave danger.’”33 Opponents within Japan 
of that country’s alliance with the U.S. were handed what he called: 
[A] terribly effective weapon to drive a wedge between two close allies. At a 
time of uncertainty due to the shifting balances of power in Asia, our 
strongest and most stable ally in the region [was] undergoing unnecessary 
turbulence, and [a] relationship which is at the very heart of our foreign 
policy [was] potentially jeopardized.34 
Solarz thought the “most serious” and “delicate” situation was Italy, which 
was “one of the keys to the southern flank of NATO” and whose government 
was equally split between a liberal party and the Communist Party.35 He noted 
                                                                                                                     
 30 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 31 Portions of the following analysis previously appeared in Spalding, Corruption, 
supra note 12, at 1375–79; Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions, supra note 12, at 357–60.  
 32 See WILLIAM D. HARTUNG, PROPHETS OF WAR: LOCKHEED MARTIN AND THE 
MAKING OF THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 115–32 (2011). 
 33 Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Consumer Prot. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong. 
172 (1977) [hereinafter 1977 Protection Hearings] (statement of Rep. Stephen S. Solarz) 
(quoting “[a] very senior politician close to former [Japanese] Prime Minister Takeo 
Mike”).  
 34 Foreign Payments Disclosure: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. 
& Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong. 141 (1976) 
[hereinafter 1976 Protection Hearing] (statement of Rep. Stephen S. Solarz). 
 35 Id.  
2015] RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 365 
 
that “[a]llegations of payments by Lockheed served to advance the Communist 
cause in Italy where the Communist bloc was strengthened by the sight of 
corrupt capitalism.”36 Congress feared that the Communist Party could gain a 
majority in the Italian parliament and the prospects for building democratic 
institutions would be lost.37 The implications of corporate bribery for the U.S. 
effort to promote the growth of liberal institutions were thus “staggering and in 
some cases, perhaps irreversible.”38  
The implications that Solarz feared were irreversible concerned the 
building of liberal economic and political institutions abroad. The institution-
building view of the FCPA was expressed with some poignancy by Democrat 
George Ball, who had become famous as a member of the Kennedy and 
Johnson Administrations for his opposition to the Vietnam War. Ball 
explained: 
The vast volume of speeches, pamphlets, and advertising copy and 
propaganda leaflets extolling the virtues of free enterprise are cancelled every 
night when managements demonstrate by their conduct that a sector of 
multinational business activity is not free; it is bought and paid for. This is a 
problem that, like so many others, has relevance in the struggle of 
antagonistic ideologies; for, when our enterprises stoop to bribery and 
kickbacks, they give substance to the communist myth—already widely 
believed in Third World countries—that capitalism is fundamentally 
corrupt.39  
Continuing this theme, the Deputy Legal Adviser in the Department of 
State under President Ford testified that corruption “jeopardizes the important 
interests we share with our friends abroad” because it undermines a form of 
government “upon which social progress, economic justice, and perhaps, 
ultimately, world peace depends.”40 Treasury Secretary William E. Simon 
further stated that it “adversely affect[s] our relations with foreign 
governments and can contribute to a general deterioration in the climate for 
fair and open international trade and investment.”41 He feared that bribery 
                                                                                                                     
 36 1977 Protection Hearings, supra note 33, at 173 (statement of Rep. Stephen S. 
Solarz). 
 37 1976 Protection Hearing, supra note 34, at 141. 
 38 Id. at 2 (statement of John M. Murphy, Chairman, Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. & 
Fin.). 
 39 Foreign and Corporate Bribes: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. 
& Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. 41–42 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Senate Banking Hearings] 
(statement of George Ball, Senior Managing Director, Lehman Brothers). 
 40 The Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad: Hearings Before 
the Subcomm. on Int’l Econ. Policy of the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 94th Cong. 23 
(1975) (statement of Mark B. Feldman, Deputy Legal Adviser, United States Department 
of State). 
 41 1976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 39, at 85 (statement of William E. 
Simon, Secretary, United States Department of the Treasury). Ultimately, President Ford 
would formally state that reports of bribery “tend to destroy confidence” in liberal-
democratic institutions. GERALD R. FORD, SPECIAL MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS 
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would weaken, rather than strengthen, these legal and economic institutions; 
the statute’s purpose, plainly, was to strengthen them. 
Whether we sought to promote liberal legal and economic institutions 
overseas out of concern for those countries, or merely to advance our strategic 
interests, is of course debatable. But that is a question of why we should build 
institutions through commerce, not whether we should do so. With the 
integration of these themes into both the Senate42 and House43 Reports, the 
bipartisan consensus concerning the FCPA’s intended effect becomes clear. 
The notion that the United States should enforce the bribery prohibition to 
wash our hands of overseas corruption, irrespective of its impact on overall 
corruption levels, was utterly absent from the deliberations. Rather, Congress 
envisioned a statute that would improve the conditions of foreign investment 
and, in turn, of global economic and political development, by promoting 
efficient, transparent, and relatively bribery-free institutions. 
Second, the current FCPA enforcement regime is by all indications rooted 
in a deterrence paradigm. The enforcement agencies’ principal response to 
findings of bribery is an investigation and a substantial fine, often in the 
hundreds of millions of dollars.44 Owing to their limited resources, the 
enforcement agencies must rely on publicizing these high-penalty actions to 
incentivize compliance among other prospective wrongdoers, thereby 
achieving a measure of general deterrence. Whether the enforcement agencies 
have adopted this theory of punishment consciously or not is perhaps less 
clear, and ultimately beside the point. The regime of selective investigation, 
substantial penalty, and deliberate publicizing to the broader community of 
similarly situated corporations is quintessential deterrence. 
Third, we have empirical evidence on the impact of enforcement on capital 
flows into overseas markets. And that evidence raises, but does not quite 
answer, questions about how these capital flow changes will impact net 
bribery levels. Though I have likewise discussed that evidence at some length 
elsewhere,45 it is worth a cursory review here. 
Empirical data from multiple sources demonstrate that anti-bribery 
enforcement causes companies subject to FCPA jurisdiction to withdraw their 
                                                                                                                     
TRANSMITTING PROPOSED FOREIGN PAYMENTS DISCLOSURE LEGISLATION, H.R. DOC. NO. 
94-572, at 1 (1976). When the Carter Administration moved in, his Treasury Secretary 
stated, “[t]he Carter Administration believes that it is damaging both to our country and to 
a healthy world economic system for American corporations to bribe foreign officials.” 
Foreign Corrupt Practices and Domestic and Foreign Investment Disclosure: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 67 (1977) (statement 
of Hon. W. Michael Blumenthal, Secretary, United States Department of the Treasury).  
 42 S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 3–4 (1977). 
 43 H. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4‒5 (1977). 
 44 See Richard L. Cassin, Alcoa Lands 5th on Our Top Ten List, FCPA BLOG (Jan. 10, 
2014, 1:08 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/1/10/alcoa-lands-5th-on-our-top-ten-
list.html, archived at http://perma.cc/GHV8-PYX7 (detailing the top ten FCPA 
enforcement actions by penalty, ranging from $152 million to $800 million). 
 45 See Spalding, Corruption, supra note 12, at 1376–81. 
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capital from developing countries. This, in turn, creates the very conditions in 
which bribery proliferates and illiberal regimes gain influence. Two sets of 
economic studies have demonstrated that anti-bribery enforcement causes 
corporations subject to its jurisdiction to do less business in bribery-prone 
markets. The first, in 1995 by James Hines, focused on the impact of the 
FCPA alone, finding that, controlling for other variables, FCPA enforcement 
caused a reduction in business in bribery-prone countries.46 To clarify, the 
thesis is not that U.S. companies were investing less overall in developing 
countries in 1995 than they were in 1976—indeed, such a conclusion would be 
absurd and patently unsupportable. Rather, the finding was that companies did 
less business in such countries than they would have if the FCPA did not exist. 
This initial study further found that total investment in bribery-prone countries 
did not drop; rather, U.S. investment was replaced by investment from 
countries without bribery prohibitions.47  
A second set of studies conducted after enactment of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Convention Against 
Bribery confirmed the finding that as anti-bribery legislation became more 
prevalent, bribery-prone countries received less of their foreign direct 
investment (FDI) from OECD nations and more from nations without bribery 
prohibitions.48 Professor Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra essentially confirmed and 
expanded upon Hines’s thesis.49 Cuervo-Cazurra’s study was narrower than 
Hines’s in that he focused exclusively on FDI, but broader in that Cuervo-
Cazurra used data on bilateral FDI inflows from 183 home economies to 106 
host economies with varying quantified corruption levels.50 
Cuervo-Cazurra further found that the phenomenon of businesses from 
countries with anti-bribery legislation investing less in highly corrupt countries 
                                                                                                                     
 46 James R. Hines, Jr., Forbidden Payment: Foreign Bribery and American Business 
After 1977, at 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5266, 1995), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w5266.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6577-
H8S4.  
 47 See id. at 20. 
 48 Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares About Corruption?, 37 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 
807, 818–19 (2006). 
 49 Id. at 818. Cuervo-Cazurra further noted that Hines’s study had become subject to 
various methodological disputes. See id. at 808‒09 (citing Shang-Jin Wei, How Taxing Is 
Corruption on International Investors?, 82 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1, 2 (2000)). Cuervo-
Cazurra believed that he had improved upon Hines’s methodology and yet confirmed the 
results. See id. Evaluating these methodologies is not the purpose of this Article. For 
further empirical studies confirming FCPA enforcement’s negative impact on FDI, see 
JOHANN GRAF LAMBSDORFF, THE INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION AND 
REFORM 174–75 (2007); Paul J. Beck et al., The Impact of the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act on US Exports, 12 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 295, 300 (1991); Anna D’Souza, 
The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Changing the Currents of Trade, 97 J. DEV. ECON. 
73, 79 (2012); Rajib Sanyal, Effect of Perception of Corruption on Outward U.S. Foreign 
Direct Investment, 10 GLOBAL BUS. & ECON. REV. 123, 137 (2008). 
 50 Cuervo-Cazurra, supra note 48, at 811. 
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was not limited to the United States. Rather, high levels of corruption in a host 
country generally resulted in less FDI from signatories to the OECD 
convention.51 The same phenomenon that Hines identified with respect to the 
United States thus became more widespread as a result of the OECD 
convention. The underside of the phenomenon that Hines first identified—
countries that are not bound by anti-bribery legislation continue to invest in 
corrupt countries—was likewise confirmed by Cuervo-Cazurra. Post-OECD, 
as signatory countries invested less in corrupt countries, countries with higher 
levels of corruption received relatively more FDI from countries with similarly 
higher corruption levels.52 The result of these trends is that as anti-bribery 
legislation became more widespread, corrupt countries received less of their 
FDI from less-corrupt countries and more of their FDI from more-corrupt 
countries.53 
In a second empirical study,54 Cuervo-Cazurra verified and restated his 
finding that countries which implemented the OECD convention had become 
“more sensitive” to corruption and had reduced their FDI in more-corrupt 
countries.55 He then proposed a modification of Hines’s original thesis, 
concluding that prior to the OECD convention, U.S. investors were not in fact 
investing less in corrupt countries, but that they began investing less after 
OECD ratification.56 In other words, the FCPA standing alone did not induce 
U.S. investors to invest less in corrupt countries, but rather the OECD induced 
both U.S. and other OECD signatories to invest less.57 
In addition to this empirical evidence, the historical record teaches that the 
U.S. Government formally embraced this very position: that FCPA 
enforcement reduced U.S. investment in developing countries. After the 
FCPA’s enactment in 1977, the U.S. government began lobbying the Western 
world to enact a similar prohibition, ultimately succeeding in 1997 with the 
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery.58 In testimony before Congress, a 
common theme was that the U.S. business community was losing business 
overseas as a result of the FCPA. In his message transmitting the convention, 
President Bill Clinton noted that the United States “has been alone” in 
criminalizing overseas bribery and that “United States corporations have 
contended that this has put them at a significant disadvantage in competing for 
                                                                                                                     
 51 See id. at 807–08. 
 52 Id. at 808. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, The Effectiveness of Laws Against Bribery Abroad, 39 J. 
INT’L BUS. STUD. 634 (2008). 
 55 Id. at 644. 
 56 Id. at 645. 
 57 See D’Souza, supra note 49, at 85. 
 58 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 
17, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-43 (1998) [hereinafter OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention].  
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international contracts with respect to foreign competitors who are not subject 
to such laws.”59 Numerous congressmen testified that the convention would 
“level[] the playing field,”60 as did SEC Associate Director Paul Gerlach.61 
Ultimately, President Clinton would adopt this metaphor in his signing 
statement.62 Moreover, the Clinton Administration calculated a very specific 
estimate of the amount of business that U.S. corporations were losing. 
President Clinton indicated in his signing statement that the value of the 
contracts lost to U.S. businesses each year as a result of the FCPA was $30 
billion.63 The Undersecretary of State64 and the General Counsel of the 
Secretary of Commerce65 encompassed the same figure in their testimony. The 
argument proved persuasive and the U.S. joined the OECD Convention.  
But the empirical studies merely confirm what common sense would 
teach: if we increase the costs of conducting business through the FCPA, we 
will tend to do less business in corrupt countries. Indeed, this sense is captured 
in the accumulation of anecdotal evidence in surveys and congressional 
testimony. A 2009 Dow Jones anti-corruption compliance survey announced 
in a press release entitled “Confusion About Anti-Corruption Laws Leads 
Companies To Abandon Expansion Initiatives,” found that 51% of companies 
had delayed a business initiative as a result of the FCPA and 14% had 
abandoned an initiative altogether.66 More recently, a 2011 survey by the 
accounting firm KPMG found that among executives surveyed in the United 
States and the United Kingdom, “[m]ore than 70 percent . . . agreed there are 
places in the world where business cannot be done without engaging in bribery 
and corruption,” and that approximately 30% of the respondents indicated that 
they deal with this risk by not doing business in certain countries.67 
                                                                                                                     
 59 Id. at III. 
 60 E.g., The International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Fin. & Hazardous Materials, 105th Cong. 1 (1998) [hereinafter 
1998 House Finance Hearing] (statement of Rep. Michael G. Oxley, Chairman, Subcomm. 
on Fin. & Hazardous Materials); id. at 4 (statement of Rep. Tom Bliley, Chairman, H. 
Comm. on Commerce).  
 61 Id. at 11 (statement of Paul V. Gerlach, Associate Director, Division of 
Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission). 
 62 Statement on Signing the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 
1998, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2011 (Nov. 10, 1998). 
 63 Id. 
 64 S. REP. NO. 105-19, at 45 (1998) (statement of Hon. Stuart E. Eizenstat, Under 
Secretary of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs). 
 65 1998 House Finance Hearing, supra note 60, at 6 (statement of Andrew J. Pincus, 
General Counsel, Department of Commerce). 
 66 See Press Release, Dow Jones, Dow Jones Survey: Confusion About Anti-
Corruption Laws Leads Companies to Abandon Expansion Initiatives (Dec. 9, 2009), 
available at http://fis.dowjones.com/risk/09survey.html, archived at http://perma.cc/Y9TS-
R2X3. 
 67 Mike Koehler, Survey Says . . ., FCPA PROFESSOR (June 2, 2011, 5:25 AM), 
http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2011/06/survey-says.html, archived at http://perma.cc 
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This capital withdrawal, and other countries’ exploitation of it, reappeared 
in more recent congressional testimony. During the June 2011 hearing on 
amending the FCPA, attorney George Terwilliger noted that while we are 
realizing the goal of heightened compliance with anti-bribery provisions:  
[T]here is another less desirable effect . . . when companies forgo business 
opportunity out of concern for FCPA compliance risk. This hurts the creation 
of [U.S.] jobs and the ability of U.S. companies to compete with companies 
elsewhere that do not have to concern themselves with uncertainties of the 
terms and requirements of the FCPA. . . . [T]here is hidden cost borne of the 
uncertainties attached to FCPA compliance risk. . . . [C]ompanies sometimes 
forgo deals they could otherwise do, take a pass on contemplated projects, or 
withdraw from ongoing projects and ventures.68  
The label we generally attach to the government-induced withdrawal of 
capital from developing countries in protest of their political conditions is 
economic sanctions. The broader project, of which this Article is a part, 
analyzes the “sanctioning effect” of anti-bribery law.69 Economic sanctions 
literature teaches that when some part of the world sanctions a given country, a 
capital void is created. Because the sanctioned country still needs that capital 
(i.e., FDI) to stimulate its economic growth, it will look to countries not 
participating in the sanctions to fill the void. These latter countries are 
sometimes called “black knights”—they rescue the sanctioned country, but 
through nefarious means.70 
Anti-corruption law is today creating a similar sanctioning effect, as the 
empirical evidence above concerning “ownership substitution” and the survey 
data demonstrate. The principal black knight in the anti-bribery space is 
China—a country with ample capital, an aggressive foreign and economic 
policy, and a near-complete absence of extraterritorial anti-corruption 
enforcement.71 When companies subject to U.S. jurisdiction find the risk of a 
bribery violation too high, and they withdraw from a project, or a sector, or a 
country, the resulting FDI void is frequently filled by Chinese or other “black 
knight” companies who are not subject to extraterritorial anti-bribery 
enforcement. 
But what effect does this dynamic have on our deterrence goals? What is 
the net impact on the overall rates of bribery, for example, in the host country? 
                                                                                                                     
/V89T-U82Q (quoting KPMG, GLOBAL ANTI-BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION SURVEY 2011, at 
18 (2011)). 
 68 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Crime, 
Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 37 (2011) 
(statement of George J. Terwilliger, III, Partner, White & Case LLP).  
 69 See Spalding, The Irony, supra note 12, at 402–03; Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions, 
supra note 12, at 372–73. Portions of Parts I.A and I.B have been adapted from material 
that previously appeared in one or more of those Articles. 
 70 See Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions, supra note 12, at 397. 
 71 See Spalding, The Irony, supra note 12, at 360–61. 
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The empirical evidence does not address this question. The next section builds 
a model to do so.   
III. DETERRENCE DETERIORATES 
This section illustrates how extraterritorial deterrence will ultimately fail 
to deliver on its promise of efficiently protecting prospective victims from 
crime. Using empirical evidence, it builds a quantitative model to demonstrate 
the impact of anti-bribery enforcement on overall levels of bribery in a host 
country. Our deterrence efforts ultimately prove to be neither effective nor 
efficient: we cannot reduce crime, and may even increase crime; and we 
cannot justify this, or any other result, to those taxpayers who seek utility 
maximization through cost efficiency. 
Though scholars up to now have not seemed particularly concerned about 
the collateral economic harm of deterring criminal behavior, contemporary 
international white-collar enforcement presents new challenges to the logic of 
deterrence. Despite deterrence’s relatively long history, originating in the 
eighteenth-century works of Montesquieu,72 Beccaria,73 and Bentham,74 the 
concept fell out of fashion and was largely neglected75 until the seminal work 
of Gary Becker in the 1960s.76 And owing largely to Cold War ideological 
divisions, international business—and particularly the flow of capital from 
developed to developing countries—would not increase significantly until 
after the collapse of communism in the early 1990s. As will be shown below, 
this new economic order raises significant theoretical and practical problems 
for deterrence.  
Extraterritorial conduct of any sort already raises formidable law 
enforcement challenges: evidence is difficult to collect, foreign enforcement 
authorities may not be cooperative or well resourced, and cultural sensitivities 
must be navigated. But this Article argues that the challenges of extraterritorial 
white-collar deterrence run far deeper. By definition, many or most actors 
committing crimes in foreign jurisdictions are not subject to the same set of 
disincentives: companies seeking to extract Nigeria’s oil will hail from the 
United States, the European Union, Russia, China, and elsewhere, and these 
countries will have substantially different white-collar crime regimes in place. 
The United States, for example, may be able to deter socially destructive 
behavior among U.S. companies and other companies subject to U.S. 
jurisdiction, but it cannot readily alter the behavior of those companies that lie 
                                                                                                                     
 72 MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 161–62 (David Wallace Carrithers ed., 
Thomas Nugent trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1977) (1748).  
 73 BECCARIA, supra note 16. 
 74 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
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 75 See Paternoster, supra note 5, at 773. 
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beyond its jurisdiction. To the extent that a country wishes to reduce criminal 
conduct in overseas locations where only a portion of all actors is subject to its 
jurisdiction, this becomes problematic. 
Of course, it may well be true that in certain areas of law the aim is not to 
reduce the overall levels of a given sort of extraterritorial crime. We may wish 
only to deter the conduct among our own citizens, perhaps untroubled by the 
impact our own deterrence efforts may have on overall levels of criminality in 
those foreign locations. But other areas of law, such as anti-bribery law, 
prohibit the overseas conduct categorically, without regard to whether the 
conduct has any harmful impact whatsoever on U.S. markets or persons. This 
section shows just how problematic that goal will prove to be. It develops a 
model77 that illustrates how, given current and foreseeable future legal and 
economic conditions, extraterritorial deterrence has pronounced crimogenic78 
tendencies. That is, in attempting to reduce crime overseas, wielding the tools 
of deterrence will often create the conditions in which the conduct we seek to 
deter actually proliferates.  
In building the model, this Article will not speculate on how a perfectly 
rational government might enforce a bribery prohibition. Rather, it seeks to 
understand how actual governments, subject to constraints in their knowledge 
and other resources, do enforce such laws. Part III.A explains the various 
assumptions that are necessary if the subsequent model is to mimic reality to 
any meaningful degree. Part III.B then builds that model, and Part III.C draws 
out the implications that pose particular problems for utilitarianism. 
A. Subrational Governments in Inefficient Markets 
FDI, particularly in developing countries, has three inherent characteristics 
that distinguish it from the domestic conduct that deterrence scholarship 
generally assumes. In combination, they create a kind of perfect storm in 
which deterrence will often prove self-defeating. 
The first I will call selective criminalization. A given form of 
extraterritorial conduct may well be criminalized by a particular home 
jurisdiction: think of express statutory prohibitions on overseas bribery or 
monopolistic conduct in the United States, and the dedication of substantial 
resources to their enforcement. But other countries may fall into either of two 
alternative categories: those that do not enforce their prohibitions, and those 
                                                                                                                     
 77 This model was first presented in a Chapman University School of Law 
Symposium entitled, What Can Law and Economics Teach Us About Corporate Social 
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that have not enacted such prohibitions. In other words, among all actors in a 
given foreign jurisdiction, the conduct is only selectively criminalized: the 
criminal prohibition applies to some of the companies pursuing Nigerian oil, 
but not to others. The United States may wish to deter bribery there, but lacks 
jurisdiction over many of the actors. 
The second characteristic I will call the discretionary investment forum. A 
typical U.S.-based company will be doing business in the United States. The 
enforcement authority thus need not worry whether that company will choose 
to continue doing business there (unless, of course, a given criminal 
prohibition threatens to drive a company out of business altogether, but this is 
rare and probably confined to highly dubious business models). But overseas 
investment forums are inherently discretionary: a U.S.-based company may 
choose to focus its efforts in the United States, or to enter overseas markets, 
and if the latter, whether to focus on the developed or developing world, and 
whether to invest in particular countries. These countries will vary in their 
legal, economic, and cultural environments, potentially creating varying levels 
of risk that a U.S.-based company will engage in conduct that its home 
jurisdiction criminalizes. Accordingly, the enforcement authority must 
consider whether its companies will do business in these jurisdictions at all. 
When the enforcement authority uses the tools of deterrence to raise the costs 
of particular behavior, the costs may rise to the level that, in certain contexts, 
the risk becomes too great. Companies may then use their discretion to not 
invest in particular projects, sectors, or countries. The effort to deter crime has 
thus deterred investment. 
Should the enforcement authority care? The question goes to the very 
heart of the law and economics methodology. Richard Posner has 
characterized law as “a system for maximizing the wealth of society.”79 The 
aim of enforcement is thus to increase wealth, for individual persons and for 
society generally. The deterrence of investment in foreign countries has 
implications for both. Companies may forego relatively efficient investment 
opportunities for safer, but less efficient (and profitable) opportunities. This, in 
turn, impacts the wealth of both the capital-exporting and the capital-importing 
nation: the exporter’s GDP is negatively impacted by the diminished profits of 
its companies; and the importer’s GDP is negatively impacted by the loss of 
foreign direct investment. If deterrence is understood as one of many 
mechanisms for increasing social wealth, deterring investment in particular 
discretionary investment forums is problematic. This becomes especially true 
in developing countries where the need to maximize wealth is most pressing. 
The third characteristic I will call investor substitution, and it is alluded to 
in the empirical studies mentioned above. Assume, for purposes of this theory, 
that the companies from diverse jurisdictions are interchangeable—that 
companies from the United States, Germany, and China are equally capable of 
providing the given good or service. This is of course not true in all industries; 
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highly technologically sophisticated sectors, for example, will tend to favor 
companies from more developed countries. But the gap is narrowing as 
developing countries like China progress, and the gap does not exist at all for 
many or most industries. Further assume that the host country’s need for FDI 
is constant, such that if companies originating from one jurisdiction are 
disinclined to do business in the manner expected by the host country, that 
host country will seek the investment from other jurisdictions. Given these 
assumptions, quasi-criminalization and the discretionary investment forum 
will result in investor substitution. Companies from a country that enforces a 
given criminal prohibition—again, think of the United States enforcing a 
bribery prohibition—may find the risk (say, of paying bribes in Nigeria) too 
high. Those companies may choose not to invest in countries like Nigeria (as 
ample empirical evidence demonstrates).80 The host country, which remains in 
need of the FDI, will seek it from companies that are from jurisdictions that do 
not enforce the prohibition. Because these companies can provide roughly the 
same good or service—in other words, the substitution costs to the host 
country are negligible—they will become substitute foreign investors.  
This analysis is related to, but significantly different from, the previous 
work on substitution. That body of scholarship, as noted above, has focused on 
a given actor substituting criminal acts Y and Z for criminal act X. It assumed 
a given set of actors, choosing among alternative forms of criminality. The 
principle of investor substitution is quite different. It assumes alternative 
actors all deciding whether to engage in the same form of criminality (or, to be 
clear, conduct that one jurisdiction deems criminal, though others do not). It is 
a variation on the substitution thesis that applies uniquely to the realm of 
extraterritorial enforcement.  
While these conditions characterize the business environment that 
governments try to regulate, a second set of conditions will describe how 
governments might go about that regulation. This Article does not assume the 
existence of a perfectly rational enforcement authority. Rather than exploring 
what a hypothetical authority should do, it explores the implications of what 
actual governments would do or have done. It posits a number of conditions 
that closely resemble the actual world of anti-bribery enforcement, conditions 
which would likely be typical of other areas of extraterritorial white-collar 
criminal enforcement as well. Such an enforcement authority is, predictably, 
economically subrational in several important respects.  
First, the enforcement authority assumes that the optimal level of bribery 
is zero, and does not engage in sophisticated arguments about whether some 
amount of bribery may actually be efficient. This assumption holds true both 
for bribery among companies subject to its jurisdiction and for overall levels 
of bribery in the host countries as well. Alternatively, one might assume that 
the enforcement authority is guided by a deontological argument—that bribery 
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2015] RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 375 
 
is inherently wrong—rather than an assumption about the relationship between 
bribery and economic efficiency. Either way, the authority is determined to 
reduce bribery as far as possible. 
Second, and relatedly, the agencies of the enforcement authority that 
enforce the bribery prohibition will actually take measures to deter bribery 
without regard for their impact on economic efficiency. Whatever they may 
have assumed about the relationship between bribery and efficiency, the 
statute charges the agencies with reducing bribery and makes no mention of its 
economic implications.  
Third, the enforcement authority is unwilling or unable to impose a 
combination of enforcement expenditures and level of penalty that would 
immediately reduce bribery to zero. It is faced with limited enforcement 
resources, uncertain political support, and imperfect empirical knowledge 
about the effects of enforcement on crime. Similarly, it likely subscribes to 
notions of fairness that will prevent it from imposing the exorbitant penalties 
that could deter bribery where the probability of detection was more limited. 
Thus constrained, the enforcement authority experiments with varying levels 
of enforcement over time (which is precisely what has occurred in the United 
States).81 Accordingly, the illustration below posits a recognizably subrational 
enforcement authority, and uses law and economics principles to trace out the 
implications of that authority’s enforcement decisions.  
B. Crimogenics Exposed 
Assume, then, a developing country (the host country) that solicits foreign 
direct investment in its infrastructure sector. In this country and sector, bribery 
is quite common. Further assume that companies from two jurisdictions—
Jurisdiction A and Jurisdiction B—have historically invested in this sector.82 
All firms competing in the host country’s infrastructure sector are from one of 
these jurisdictions; no companies from jurisdictions other than A or B are 
investing there. 
The host country will regularly issue requests for proposals (RFPs) and 
companies will submit bids in an effort to win contracts. Each contract 
involves a variety of transactions in which bribes would typically be paid: 
some would be paid during the bidding process (preparing and submitting the 
bid, then winning the contract) and others would be paid in the course of 
performing the contract (visas, permits, inspections, etc.). Further assume that 
the number of transactions per contract is fixed, resulting in a fixed number of 
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 82 I use “jurisdiction” rather than “country” because often the jurisdiction of a given 
country will extend to companies from other countries as well—for example, certain 
foreign companies are subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. extraterritorial anti-bribery 
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total transactions. For purposes of this argument, assume that 100% of all 
business transactions in the host country’s government have involved bribes.  
At a time that we shall call Time 1, neither Jurisdiction A nor Jurisdiction 
B is enforcing an extraterritorial bribery prohibition. Firms from both A and B 
therefore pay bribes freely. But Jurisdiction A firms are more efficient than 
Jurisdiction B firms, such that A firms in Time 1 win 60% of the contracts and 
B firms win 40%. The chart below captures these numbers. 
 
Table 1 
 
Time Enforcement Level 
% Market 
Share for 
Firms from 
Jurisdiction A
% Bribes That 
A Firms Pay 
in Their 
Transactions 
Overall Rate 
of Bribery in 
Host 
Country 
T1 None 60 100 100 
 
Firms from Jurisdiction A win 60% of the contracts, but pay bribes in 
100% of the transactions. Jurisdiction B firms thus have a 40% market share, 
and likewise bribe 100% of the time. The overall rate of bribery in the 
infrastructure sector of the host country is therefore 100% in Time 1. 
However, at Time 2, Jurisdiction A announces that it will begin enforcing 
an extraterritorial criminal bribery prohibition. The enforcement agencies are, 
again, subrational actors, so they are unable to implement an enforcement 
regime that would reduce bribery to zero: they cannot dedicate the resources 
necessary to raise the probability of detection to the requisite level, and 
fairness principles do not allow them to impose exorbitant penalties that would 
compensate for the low level of detection. Constrained as they are by limited 
resources and by fairness, they commence what we will call a low level of 
enforcement. Jurisdiction B does not follow suit and does not implement any 
kind of extraterritorial bribery prohibition, so B firms continue to bribe freely.  
The host country issues a new set of RFPs and awards all available 
contracts to firms from Jurisdictions A and B. A firms now become what we 
will call reluctant bribe payers. They do not stop paying bribes altogether, but 
they begin searching for ways to avoid paying bribes where possible while 
remaining present in the sector and profitable. While they may have previously 
paid a small bribe to expedite a visa approval, they are now willing to wait; 
instead of paying a bribe to send their goods immediately through customs, 
their ships wait in line for days in the harbor. Similarly, the government of 
Jurisdiction A begins working on behalf of its companies to reduce the 
demand for bribery in the host country (as the U.S. and U.K. governments do 
today).  
The reluctant bribe payers (companies from Jurisdiction A) recognize that 
avoiding bribes will often reduce their efficiency—waiting in the harbor for 
customs approval is not without cost to the company. But they are willing to 
absorb these costs to reduce the risk of penalty for violating the prohibition. 
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Although the risk of penalty is high enough to deter a certain amount of 
bribery, it is not high enough to completely stop paying bribes. For reluctant 
bribe payers, the benefits of continuing to invest in the host country remain 
high enough that the company can pay some bribes and accept the risk that it 
will be caught and penalized for violating the bribery prohibition.  
In the course of continuing to do business in the host country, the reluctant 
bribe payer will therefore encounter three kinds of transactions. The first is 
where the risk of detection is sufficiently high (or the firm is sufficiently 
principled) that it refuses to pay the bribe but can still find ways to complete 
the transaction. These may entail increased costs for the firm (such as waiting 
in line at port) but owing to the firm’s efficiency (or the less than perfectly 
competitive market conditions) the firm can absorb these costs while 
remaining profitable. Alternatively, the firm may seek the diplomatic 
assistance of the governments (in the United States, these would be the 
Departments of Commerce or State). This is the kind of conduct that anti-
bribery advocates seek to incentivize and may generally assume occurs. 
However, the firm will encounter a second kind of bribe, in which it will 
likewise refuse to pay but cannot complete the transaction without it. The firm 
must therefore knowingly forego the transaction; the best example would be a 
lost bid in a RFP. For the third kind of bribe, the risk of detection may be 
sufficiently low, or the costs of foregoing the transaction are sufficiently high 
(the company really needs this particular bid, or cannot afford to wait three 
days in port) that the firm will pay the bribe and accept the risk of detection.83  
Given the three types of bribes the firm will encounter and Jurisdiction 
A’s new but still-low level of enforcement, assume that A firms reduce their 
bribery by half. They are now willing pay bribes in 50% of all transactions. 
Assume further that as a result, the percentage of contracts they will be able to 
win also drops by half, from 60% of all contracts to 30% of all contracts. 
Investor substitution occurs, and B firms win the extra 30% of the contracts. 
Now A firms have 30% of the market and B firms have 70%. Owing to the 
downside of deterrence’s upside, B firms continue to bribe in 100% of all their 
transactions, and therefore will bribe on the extra 30% of the contracts they 
will win. But because A firms were paying bribes on those contracts in Time 
1, investor substitution has not resulted in a net increase in bribery in the host 
country. 
                                                                                                                     
 83 The ability of companies from Jurisdiction A to absorb a degree of lost profits but 
remain competitive assumes that the market is not what economists would consider 
perfectly competitive. If it was, the companies would have no margin to absorb the losses 
because competitors would have already been selling at the lower cost. But foreign direct 
investment is not perfectly competitive, in at least two respects. First, often a sort of 
oligopoly exists where only select companies from select countries are positioned to 
compete. Second, some companies might have a competitive advantage by virtue of their 
access to capital, technological, or various forms of government support. Accordingly, this 
illustration assumes that Jurisdiction A firms are operating at a level of profitability that 
permits them to absorb limited losses to comply with the statute. 
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 Rather, A’s low level of enforcement has thus succeeded in two respects. 
Of the 30% of the contracts that A firms win, they will only pay bribes in 50% 
of these transactions. For half of this 30%, or 15%, no bribes are being paid; 
this portion of the host country’s infrastructure sector is now clean. A’s 
enforcement has thus reduced bribery among its own firms by 50%, and has 
reduced net bribery levels in the host country by 15%.  
 
Table 2 
 
Time Enforcement Level 
% Market 
Share for 
Firms from 
Jurisdiction A 
% Bribes 
That A Firms 
Pay in Their 
Transactions 
Overall Rate 
of Bribery 
in Host 
Country 
T1 None 60 100 100 
T2 Low 30 50 85 
 
Again, overall levels of bribery have gone down from 100% to 85% 
because A firms have a 30% market share and are not paying bribes on half of 
the related transactions. This is the outcome that anti-bribery advocates take 
for granted, and for those who accept the normative premise that federal law 
should deter overseas bribery, it is the reason to continue enforcement. 
But now assume a subsequent point in time, called Time 3. The 
enforcement authorities in Jurisdiction A, perhaps encouraged from the 
successes of Time 2, have decided to ramp up enforcement through the 
dedication of new resources. We will call this mid-level enforcement, and it 
significantly increases the likelihood of detecting violations. In Time 3, the 
host country issues a new set of RFPs. The other assumptions still hold: the 
total number of transactions is again fixed, companies from Jurisdictions A 
and B will again compete, and companies from Jurisdiction B still bribe 
without fear of punishment. 
Companies from Jurisdiction A now engage in a new cost-benefit analysis. 
They conclude that because the risk of detection and therefore penalty is 
higher, they must pay even fewer bribes than they did in Time 2. Say that mid-
level enforcement induces A firms to reduce their bribery percentage from 
50% to 25% of all transactions.  
The mid-level enforcement regime has thus succeeded in reducing bribery 
among companies subject to its jurisdiction. But consider the impact that 
investor substitution will now have on the change in overall bribery levels 
from Time 2 to Time 3. Although A firms won 60% of all contracts when 
bribing 100% of the time, they can now win only 1/4 of those contracts.84 
                                                                                                                     
 84 This exercise assumes that the percentage of contracts it can win will drop in 
precisely the same amount as the percentage of bribes it can pay. In practice, the 
relationship between these two figures would be more complex. 
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They now have only a 15% market share, down from 30% in Time 2. The 15% 
market share that A firms have lost since Time 2 will now go to B firms, 
which continue to bribe 100% of the time. In other words, 15% of the 
transactions have shifted from reluctant bribe payers to free bribe payers. A 
firms remain engaged in only 15% of all transactions in the host country’s 
infrastructure sector, and they will pay bribes in 1/4 of that 15%. Accordingly, 
A firms are bribe-free in 11% of all transactions. Because all other transactions 
are paid with bribes, the overall bribery level in the host country is now at 
89%.  
 
Table 3 
 
Time Enforcement Level 
% Market 
Share for 
Firms from 
Jurisdiction A 
% Bribes That 
A Firms Pay 
in Their 
Transactions 
Overall Rate 
of Bribery in 
Host Country 
T1 None 60 100 100 
T2 Low 30 50 85 
T3 Mid 15 25 89 
 
From Time 2, overall bribery has increased by 4%. And that increase is 
entirely due to Jurisdiction A’s increased enforcement effort.   
Consider a further period in time, Time 4, in which Jurisdiction A has 
finally resolved to dedicate the enforcement resources necessary to achieve 
what it deems the optimal rate of bribery among its firms—0%. And suppose it 
succeeds, such that now A firms pay absolutely no bribes. Further assume that 
all other conditions remain the same, and the host country issues a new set of 
RFPs. Jurisdiction A firms can no longer win contracts in this host country’s 
infrastructure sector. B firms now win 100% of the contracts, engage in 100% 
of the transactions, and pay bribes 100% of the time. While the rate of bribery 
among A firms is now 0%, the overall rate of bribery in the host country is 
100%.  
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Table 4 
 
Time Enforcement Level 
% Market 
Share for 
Firms from 
Jurisdiction A 
% Bribes That 
A Firms Pay 
in Their 
Transactions 
Overall Rate 
of Bribery in 
Host 
Country 
T1 None 60 100 100 
T2 Low 30 50 85 
T3 Mid 15 25 89 
T4 High 0 0 100 
 
Notice the pattern. At Time 2, its efforts to deter bribery were effective in 
reducing the overall level of bribery in the host country. Companies from 
Jurisdiction A indeed lost business as a result of the decision to enforce the 
bribery prohibition. But in Time 1, companies from Jurisdiction A were 
bribing as freely as companies from Jurisdiction B, so losing business to 
companies from Jurisdiction B at Time 2 did not result in an increase in 
bribery for the host country. Then at Time 3, the second increase in 
enforcement has reduced bribery only among companies subject to A’s 
jurisdiction. Those companies are indeed bribing less, but owing to investor 
substitution, the impact on overall levels of bribery in the host country is a net 
increase. And we saw at Time 4 that raising penalty risks further can produce a 
scenario in which the rates of bribery in the host country return to 100%, a 
level not seen since before the enforcement effort began.  
In sum, after Time 1, the overall rate of bribery in the host country 
correlates inversely with Jurisdiction A’s enforcement. Likewise, it correlates 
inversely with the percentage of bribes that A firms are paying. As Jurisdiction 
A attempts, and succeeds, in decreasing bribery among its own companies, it 
increases overall bribery in the developing country. 
This illustration is of course artificially simplified. In reality, a number of 
additional variables would influence the net impact of increased enforcement: 
the number of transactions, the number of agencies or persons soliciting 
bribes, changes in the level of penalty, changes in the effectiveness of the 
reluctant bribe payer’s tools for avoiding bribes, and perhaps most 
importantly, a decrease in the percentage of transactions in developing 
countries that require bribes. Expanding this model to include each of these 
variables is a project for another day. But this thought experiment nevertheless 
illustrates limitations inherent in the effort to deter extraterritorial white-collar 
crime, given current global economic and legal conditions. And it raises two 
distinct utilitarian problems. 
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C. Am I My Brother’s Utility Maximizer?  
Though the enforcement authority’s aim is to maximize utility, 
extraterritorial white-collar deterrence will tend to produce two distinct forms 
of disutility. 
The first is, quite simply, that it often will not work. As explained above, 
overseas business environments will often produce an increase, rather than a 
decrease, in the conduct we seek to deter. This will be true as long as capital-
exporting jurisdictions vary in their enactment and enforcement of criminal 
prohibitions. The answer, one might think, is to tinker with the variables 
available to the enforcement authority: enforcement expenditures, fine levels, 
the length of imprisonment, and the standard for imposing liability. The 
problem, however, is that once into Time 2, decreasing the cost of the penalty 
through any of these four variables will necessarily decrease the disincentive 
to engage in the act: reducing enforcement expenditures, fines, or prison terms, 
or raising the standard for imposing liability, will decrease the costs of crime 
and increase its frequency. 
In Times 2 and 3, the enforcement authority is trapped. By not increasing 
the risk of detection, it tolerates a measure of criminality among persons 
subject to its jurisdiction. But by raising the risk of detection, it produces the 
concurrent decrease in criminality among its companies, and an increase in 
that same behavior in the host country among all actors. These are the Scylla 
and Charybdis of extraterritorial white-collar criminal enforcement. The 
enforcement authority must choose between the harm of knowingly tolerating 
preventable criminality among its own companies, and knowingly increasing 
levels of criminality in vulnerable developing countries. It cannot avoid both. 
The enforcement authority thus seeks the golden mean or, if one prefers, 
the Goldilocks theory, of enforcement: to enforce its prohibition only to the 
point that it deters overall levels of bribery, and not further. The law and 
economics enforcement authority is trapped in this dilemma, unable to achieve 
what it considers the optimal level of criminality among its own actors without 
raising levels of the same conduct in the host country. 
But even if the first problem were resolved, and overseas deterrence 
efforts were to effectively reduce crime, the law and economics enforcement 
authority would be left with a second problem. Consider again the assumption 
behind the economic theory of public enforcement: the taxpayer is the 
potential victim, and she pays taxes to prevent her victimization. That works in 
domestic enforcement, where all potential victims are taxpayers and all 
taxpayers are potential victims. But what if the victims are not taxpayers, and 
the taxpayers are not victims? What if the victims lie beyond the jurisdiction 
that is enforcing the criminal prohibition, and are therefore not paying the 
taxes that fund enforcement? Put another way, am I my brother’s utility 
maximizer? 
Again using the anti-bribery example, we devote substantial public 
resources to protecting those overseas victims through the DOJ, SEC, FBI, 
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offices in Commerce and State, and the federal judiciary.85 And various 
economic benefits might very well accrue to U.S. taxpayers, including the 
improvement of overseas markets and the resulting potential for economic and 
political alliances. But stakeholders to anti-bribery enforcement generally 
agree that the principal victims of extraterritorial bribery are the citizens of the 
overseas governments. And they’re not paying for enforcement. That is, 
Congress enacted a statute in which U.S. taxpayers would pay to protect non-
taxpayers from the harms of bribery. To the utility-maximizing taxpayer 
typically associated with law and economics, this is the second disutility of 
deterrence. It is inescapable, and reflects the limitations of the deterrence 
paradigm in explaining not just how to deter overseas criminality, but why we 
should even try. 
To the extent that the extraterritorial statute is designed both to deter 
criminality among the jurisdiction’s own actors and to reduce overall levels of 
crime, the traditional mechanisms of deterrence may not be the most effective 
tools available. That is, the means typically employed by deterrence advocates 
may not be best suited to achieve deterrence’s goals. Rather, the achievement 
of deterrence goals may require using non-deterrence, or extra-deterrence, 
means. 
As the above illustration shows, extraterritorial crime reduction requires 
reaching two sets of actors who lie beyond the reach of the enforcement 
authority. The first is the host country: to the extent that a capital-importing 
country can enforce its own prohibitions (on bribery, for instance) no investor 
substitution can occur. All companies investing in that country would (in 
theory) be subject to the same risks and costs, and would engage in crime at 
roughly similar levels. If the host country sought to reduce a given form of 
conduct to zero, it could do so, and differences among the capital-exporting 
jurisdictions would become irrelevant. But a developing country, almost by 
definition, is ill-equipped to do so; its state is not yet sufficiently resourced to 
deter the conduct of powerful foreign firms. This is thus a long-term project. 
Accordingly, the capital-exporting jurisdiction seeking to deter destructive 
conduct in foreign countries can also seek to influence the behavior of 
competing capital-exporting jurisdictions that do not enforce comparable 
prohibitions (the B Jurisdictions). The problem, of course, is that the enforcing 
jurisdictions (the A Jurisdictions) generally have no authority over either the 
capital-importing or capital-exporting governments. 
But notice the relatively modest—and therefore perhaps not intractable—
problem. At Time 3, when the overall rates of bribery in this model increased 
for the first time, the difference was relatively slight: a mere 4%. At Time 4, 
when the enforcing jurisdiction resolved to achieve the optimal level of 
                                                                                                                     
 85 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO 
THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 4–7 (2012) [hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDE], 
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/V86D-N7QQ.  
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bribery among its companies (namely, none) the overall level increased by 
another 11%.  
These numbers are not staggering. But when the policy aim is crime 
reduction in the host country, any crime increase that results directly from our 
enforcement efforts merits some attention. Admittedly, criminal enforcement 
would unleash other forces that would chip away at this increase, particularly 
where the enforcement actions are publicized. Civil society can agitate for 
reforms. Other states can wield the levers of international diplomacy. 
International organizations can pressure non-enforcing jurisdictions through 
review mechanisms. These forces are significant, and this analysis does not 
mean to dismiss them. But acknowledging a perverse enforcement outcome, 
and merely hoping that other entities or policy initiatives will reverse it, is 
hardly satisfactory. This Article aims to identify an approach to criminal 
enforcement that would itself achieve the stated aim of reducing crime. The 
next section does so. 
IV. RESTORATIVE JUSTICE FOR CORPORATIONS AND THEIR VICTIMS 
As the above model illustrates, the deterrence approach suffers from two 
distinct but closely related limitations that in combination prove fatal. First, it 
cannot reach competitor firms from jurisdictions that do not enforce the 
extraterritorial prohibition. Extraterritorial deterrence fails because not all 
potential violators are subject to the enforcing country’s jurisdiction. But this 
is not the only way to approach crime reduction in a foreign jurisdiction. The 
other would be to adopt host-country reforms that could reduce the 
environmental inducements (such as bribe solicitation or extortion) that give 
rise to crime. We might use criminal enforcement to identify the causes of 
crime and to identify or fund initiatives to address those causes. But the law-
and-economics approach to deterrence undertakes no such thing; it does not 
even try to reach the host country governments. It merely punishes the 
wrongdoer, with the aim of specifically deterring the wrongdoer’s recidivism 
and generally deterring others through fear of punishment.  
The solution, then, lies in an alternative theory of criminal punishment that 
aspires to more than specific and general deterrence. Absent an extraordinarily 
broad theory of jurisdiction for extraterritorial crime no theory of punishment 
can extend deterrence’s sphere influence to reach foreign competitors. What 
extraterritorial criminal enforcement needs, then, is a foundational theory of 
punishment that looks beyond the potential violators within its jurisdiction and 
engages with the broader social and legal environment in which the crime 
occurred. Criminal theory provides three basic possibilities: deterrence, 
retribution, and rehabilitation/restoration.86  
The above critique of extraterritorial enforcement will typically first evoke 
a retributivist response: we punish these corporate criminals to ensure that they 
                                                                                                                     
 86 MIETHE & LU, supra note 21, at 15. 
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get what they deserve, not because of some kind of cost-benefit analysis on 
social impact.87 By this argument U.S. law does not and should not aim to 
actually reduce crime in overseas countries; we enforce to express our 
disapproval of the criminal act, and the collateral consequences are quite 
beside the point.  
Applied to extraterritorial white-collar enforcement, the retributivist 
position is completely coherent. And absent a contrary policy commitment, 
retribution would provide a sufficient justification for extraterritorial 
enforcement efforts. But this Article is based on the premise that in certain 
areas of law—anti-bribery being the best example—our statutes are in fact 
based on the expectation that our enforcement efforts would reduce crime in 
the countries in which we do business.  
What is needed, then, is a theory of criminal justice that seeks to reduce 
crime but looks beyond the potential offender’s cost-benefit analysis. That 
theory is restorative justice. Though typically associated with traditional 
crimes committed by natural persons, Part IV will argue that restorative justice 
can, and should, apply to extraterritorial corporate crime. Part IV.A will 
describe the restorative justice approach and show that it is now in practice in 
federal white-collar environmental enforcement in the form of supplemental 
sentences. Part IV.B will explain how the U.S. Constitution provides the 
contours of this sentencing practice: a constitutional tension between the 
executive and legislative functions ultimately produced a series of guidelines 
for supplemental sentences that are readily transferable to extraterritorial 
white-collar enforcement. Part IV.C will then show that supplemental 
sentences are likewise already authorized, and indeed encouraged, under 
existing federal sentencing law. Finally, Part IV.D will describe the 
unexpectedly simple solution to the problem that this Article has taken such 
pains to describe: the transference of existing domestic white-collar 
enforcement procedures to extraterritorial enforcement.  
A. The Corporate Criminal as Social Healer 
A body of scholarship has long argued for moving away from the 
traditional adversarial model of legal practice and toward an understanding of 
the lawyer as a “peacemaker.” By this account, the lawyer’s aim in practice is 
to prevent future conflict by understanding and improving social interactions 
between offender, victim, and community.88 Lawyering is thus recast as a 
“healing profession,” taking a “restorative” approach to the practice of law.89  
                                                                                                                     
 87 Id. at 16; see PHILIP BEAN, PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHICAL AND CRIMINOLOGICAL 
INQUIRY 13 (1981); Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 25, 30 (Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1972). 
 88 Forrest S. Mosten, Lawyer as Peacemaker: Building a Successful Law Practice 
Without Ever Going to Court, 43 FAM. L.Q. 489, 489 (2009). 
 89 Susan Daicoff, Law as a Healing Profession: The “Comprehensive Law 
Movement,” 6 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1, 1 (2006). 
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Suffice it to say that this literature is not typically associated with 
multinational corporate practice. But might it be? Can multinational 
corporations, who have committed crimes, heal social wounds? Can corporate 
defense counsel, and federal prosecutors, be peacemakers? This section posits 
that the answer is yes. But it is not a mere potentiality. I argue that this is 
already happening, in federal white-collar criminal enforcement, and that those 
practices can extend—indeed, should extend—to extraterritorial white-collar 
crimes.  
Restorative justice (RJ) emerged in the 1970s in response to widespread 
perceptions that the criminal justice system “neither effectively deterred crime 
nor successfully rehabilitated offenders.”90 RJ differs from deterrence in 
focusing on more than just the defendant and its cost-benefit analysis. Rather 
than deterrence’s exclusive focus on the defendant, RJ focuses on three 
distinct “stakeholders” to crime: the victim(s), the offender(s), and the affected 
communities.91 It involves all three stakeholders in the sentencing, and is 
based on the fundamental principle that criminal behavior not only violates the 
law, but “also injures victims and the community.”92 Core assumptions of RJ 
include: the response to crime should repair the harm to the victim as much as 
possible; offenders should recognize the impact of the harm on the victim and 
the community; victims should have an opportunity to express their needs and 
participate in the determining the best way to make reparation; and the 
community has a responsibility to contribute to this process.93 It aims not just 
to punish and prevent crime, but to actually restore the relationship between 
the offender, the victim, and the social environment. The victim is restored, the 
offender recognizes his wrong, and the fear of crime is diminished for the 
community.94  
Accordingly, where deterrence is one-dimensional in its focus on the 
offender, RJ is three-dimensional: in addition to the offender, it focuses on the 
victim as well as the social environment that gave rise to the offense. RJ has 
been defined as a form of punishment that is primarily oriented towards doing 
justice by restoring the harm that has been caused by a crime.95 It focuses on 
repairing or compensating the victim, in order to restore the public’s 
confidence that the crime has been condemned, disapproving of the norm 
                                                                                                                     
 90 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Restorative Justice: What Is It and Does It Work?, 3 ANN. 
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 161, 163 (2007). 
 91 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 7, at 11. 
 92 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 7, at 6. 
 93 Id. at 8.  
 94 Andrew von Hirsch et al., Specifying Aims and Limits for Restorative Justice: A 
‘Making Amends’ Model?, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COMPETING 
OR RECONCILABLE PARADIGMS? 21, 22 (Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds., 2003). 
 95 See Gordon Bazemore & Lode Walgrave, Restorative Juvenile Justice: In Search of 
Fundamentals and an Outline for Systemic Reform, in RESTORATIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE: 
REPAIRING THE HARM OF YOUTH CRIME 45, 48 (Gordon Bazemore & Lode Walgrave eds., 
1999).  
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transgression, and reassurance of the norm and norm enforcement to the 
public, victims, and offenders.96 This focus on the victim might be called the 
second dimension of punishment. 
But RJ is not merely a set of outcomes; so too is it a process by which the 
victim, offender, and affected community members “participate . . . actively in 
the resolution of matters arising from the crime.”97 This involvement of the 
community introduces the third dimension. Indeed, another scholar has 
defined RJ as “a process whereby all the parties with a stake in a particular 
offence come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of 
the offence and its implications for the future.”98 Through the process, both the 
victim and the offender come to understand the factors that gave rise to the 
damaging behavior.99 “Others who had a role to play in the offence or the 
circumstances that led to it are also encouraged to assume responsibility for 
their part . . . .”100 The process “encourages frank discussion of the 
background of the offence in a spirit of explanation rather than making 
excuses.”101 Ultimately, the sentencing process should be helpful in 
“identifying underlying causes of crime and developing crime prevention 
strategies.”102 
However, in focusing on the victim and the community, RJ need not call 
attention away from, or otherwise “go light” on, the offender. Much 
scholarship has addressed the question of whether punishment of the offender 
is indeed consistent with restorative goals. Early RJ thought was characterized 
by a dichotomy. Advocates of RJ argued that in seeking restoration we must 
eschew retribution and punishment, while advocates of punishment argued 
punishment must always be the primary aim of the state’s response to crime, 
and that restoration must be a secondary goal that can be pursued only insofar 
as it does not compromise retribution’s core values of justice, proportionality, 
and fairness.103 But others have demonstrated this dichotomy to be false: that 
retribution remains an important component of RJ, and that full restoration 
actually requires retribution and punishment.104 Indeed, insofar as restoration 
still aims to give victims and community members reassurance both that 
justice has been served, and that future harms have been prevented, 
                                                                                                                     
 96 See Lode Walgrave, Imposing Restoration Instead of Inflicting Pain: Reflections on 
the Judicial Reaction to Crime, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
COMPETING OR RECONCILABLE PARADIGMS?, supra note 94, at 61, 65. 
 97 E.S.C. Res. 2002/12, U.N. Doc. E/2000/INF/2/Add.2, at I.2 (July 24, 2002).  
 98 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 7, at 11. 
 99 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 7, at 9. 
 100 Id. at 11. 
 101 Id.  
 102 Id. at 10.  
 103 Antony Duff, Restoration and Retribution, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: COMPETING OR RECONCILABLE PARADIGMS?, supra note 94, at 43, 43. 
 104 Id. 
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punishment is essential. RJ programs “complement rather than replace the 
existing criminal justice system.”105  
But the punishment is different: it is not merely symbolic, nor is it aimed 
merely at deterrence, whether specific or general. Rather, the offender’s 
restoration is enhanced by his voluntary participation and cooperation in the 
process. His voluntary agreement to repair or compensate “expresses his 
understanding of the wrongs committed and harms caused, as well as his 
willingness to make amends.”106 A restorative outcome is, by definition, an 
agreement.107 RJ thus provides the offender “with an opportunity to make 
meaningful reparation.”108 Punishment is a means, not an end; restoration is 
the end.109 
As RJ evolved in practice, several core practices emerged. Both the 
offender(s) and the victim(s) participate directly and personally in a process of 
speaking about their role in the crime and listening to the other’s narrative. 
Each talks about what occurred, why it occurred, and the harm it caused. The 
offender acknowledges his conduct and its wrongfulness, and apologizes to the 
victim(s). The victim(s) draw into a deeper understanding of the causes, 
sometimes systemic, of the crime, and can sometimes work toward an attitude 
of forgiveness (but not forgetfulness) of the act. All persons contribute to a 
determination of the appropriate restitution. Among the goals of restitution is 
the reintegration of the wrongdoer into the larger community. Ideally, the 
wrongdoer and the victim achieve a degree of reconciliation and a shared 
understanding of appropriate social norms. Both then try to adopt a future-
oriented perspective that focuses on the rebuilding of social relationships.110 
These practices expose deeper truths about state-sanctioned criminality, allow 
for deeper understandings among the perpetrators and the victims, and can 
allow a society to “begin anew with transformative understandings of both its 
past and its future.”111  
The suggestion that this theory of punishment could apply to any 
meaningful extent to multinational corporate crime will give rise to three 
objections. The first is that RJ is designed for traditional crimes involving 
natural-person offenders and discrete victims, not large-scale institutional 
crimes. And the premise is to a large extent true: RJ tends to be most widely 
practiced and discussed in relation to traditional, discrete crimes involving 
smaller communities and utilizing alternative sentencing procedures such as 
victim-offender mediation, community and family group conferencing, circle 
sentencing, and peacemaking circles.112 
                                                                                                                     
 105 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 7, at 13. 
 106 Walgrave, supra note 96, at 62. 
 107 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 7, at 7. 
 108 Id. at 11. 
 109 Walgrave, supra note 96, at 64. 
 110 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 90, at 164. 
 111 Id. at 169. 
 112 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 7, at 14–15. 
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But RJ has since expanded, and arguably its most-widely recognized form 
today is indeed a large-scale institutional crime with dispersed victims: the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In the 1990s restorative justice 
practices moved from individual acts of wrongdoing to systematic wrongdoing 
by state actors, such as civil wars and illegitimate regimes such as 
apartheid.113 Since then, more than twenty-five developing countries have 
instituted variations of restorative justice principles to heal from large-scale 
crimes in which the state participated. If RJ can apply to crimes committed on 
this scale, by institutional actors against broad communities, it can no less 
easily apply to corporate crimes. 
Skeptics may counter with two additional points, both of which are refuted 
by the same body of evidence. First, a difference allegedly remains between 
the state crimes that truth and reconciliation commissions address, and white-
collar crimes. While the former had concededly given rise to RJ approaches, 
applying RJ to multinational corporate crime may be unworkable, and at any 
rate is normatively unpalatable.114 Second, skeptics will argue that even if RJ 
for white-collar crime is workable in theory, the enforcement agencies will 
never embrace such an outlandish and academic proposition.115 
Neither is true. For twenty-five years, the U.S. Department of Justice has 
applied alternative sentencing practices to white-collar defendants. In 
conjunction with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the DOJ has 
developed a robust and well-defined practice of what is called the 
“supplemental sentence.” The civil-side version of these sentences is perhaps 
better known, as it has a catchier moniker: the Supplemental Environmental 
Project, or SEP. But an almost identical practice exists in criminal 
enforcement, and this practice resounds in RJ themes. 
In recent years supplemental projects have increased in popularity and 
visibility. The DOJ has provided several reasons why this is so, all of which 
readily apply to extraterritorial white-collar crime. First, prosecutors “want to 
rectify the wrongs” caused by violations, and feel that more conventional 
                                                                                                                     
 113 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 90, at 169. 
 114 Some scholars have discussed, however tentatively, the possibility of applying RJ 
to white-collar crime. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 7, at 62–66. One of the founders of the 
restorative justice movement, John Braithwaite of Australia National University, has 
argued for its applicability to corporate crime. Id. He finds that when state regulators 
participate in negotiations with corporate managers or industry leaders, the resulting 
enforcement actions are more flexible and realistic, and the punishment is generally much 
more effective than traditional deterrence measures in promoting corporate compliance. 
Id.; see Marianne Löschnig-Gspandl, Corporations, Crime and Restorative Justice, in 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN CONTEXT: INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE AND DIRECTIONS 145, 145 
(Elmar G.M. Weitekamp & Hans-Jürgen Kerner eds., 2003). 
 115 The U.S. Department of Justice has, in other contexts, explicitly embraced RJ in the 
context of other areas of crime. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IDENTIFYING CULTURALLY 
RESPONSIVE VICTIM-CENTERED RESTORATIVE JUSTICE STRATEGIES (2012), available at 
http://ojp.gov/ovc/grants/pdftxt/FY2012_Identifying_Culturally_Responsive_Victim.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/GR25-24CB. 
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criminal sentences fail to do so. Second, corporate defendants frequently wish 
to perform community service and actually prefer it to simply paying a fine, 
even where the service may prove more expensive. Third, judges often feel 
that they are “doing more good for the community” by using the settlement 
funds for community service instead of depositing those funds in the U.S. 
treasury.116  
Note how naturally these three policy goals would apply to many forms of 
white-collar crime; they are in no way unique to environmental violations. 
Indeed, they are especially applicable to extraterritorial bribery, where 
multiple stakeholders have for years criticized modern enforcement for its 
failure to compensate the victims and otherwise improve the conditions in the 
communities where the bribes occurred.117 As is always the case with 
extraterritorial enforcement, the crime occurred overseas, but the fine is 
deposited in the U.S. treasury. The real victims—those impacted directly by 
the crime—obviously receive scant benefit from the deposit.118  
Notice also the obvious RJ themes in this analysis. The prosecutors wish 
to remedy the harm and not merely punish the defendant. Corporate 
defendants often express a preference for community service; though they may 
well be motivated by concerns for reputation and, by extension, long-term 
profits, they nonetheless are seeking to restore their relationship to the 
community to its pre-crime state. And the judges also see greater community 
benefits in the supplemental sentences; more to the point, they believe that 
these benefits are a legitimate and appropriate aim of criminal sentencing.  
Several recent examples of supplemental sentences illustrate this. In 2009, 
a gas company paid a total of $18 million for illegally storing mercury. The 
sentence included a $6 million criminal fine and $12 million in payments to 
various local community initiatives to support environmental remediation and 
                                                                                                                     
 116 Kris Dighe, Organizational Community Service in Environmental Crimes Cases, 
U.S. ATT’Y BULL., July 2012, at 100, 100, available at http://www.justice.gov 
/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usab6004.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/TN3Y-3L9G. 
 117 See Letter from Alexander W. Sierck to Robert S. Khuzami, Dir., Enforcement 
Div., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Apr. 25, 2012), available at http://www.fcpablog.com 
/blog/2012/3/16/african-ngo-asks-for-distribution-of-fcpa-recoveries.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/2RVR-E7XK; see also Matthew C. Turk, A Political Economy Approach to 
Reforming the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 33 Nw. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 325, 336‒40 
(2013).  
 118 Moreover, FCPA enforcement has, perhaps unwittingly, supplied one high-profile 
example of a quasi-restorative approach to criminal enforcement. In settling the case of 
James Giffen, the United States arranged with officials in Kazakhstan and Switzerland to 
release the $80 million in alleged bribes from their Swiss accounts and establish a trust 
fund to be managed by a Kazakhstani NGO. David Glovin, Oil Dealer Giffen Avoids 
Prison in Onetime Bribe Case, BLOOMBERG L., Nov. 19, 2010, at 3. This fund was to be 
used to pay for programs for poor children and improve transparency in the Kazakh oil 
industry. Id.  
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education projects and children’s health initiatives.119 In 2010, a ship 
management firm paid a total of $10 million to settle criminal violations of the 
Oil Pollution Act for causing and covering up an oil spill after one of its ships 
hit the San Francisco Bay Bridge. Pursuant to the plea agreement, $2 million 
of the total $10 million will fund marine environmental projects in San 
Francisco Bay.120 In 2012, a producer of pesticides agreed to pay a criminal 
fine and perform community service to settle eleven criminal violations of the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act in relation to applying 
insecticides to its wild bird food products. In addition to the $4 million 
criminal fine, the defendant contributed $500,000 to various organizations that 
protect bird habitat in the immediate vicinity of the violations to fund 
conservation, research, and education.121  
But 2013 proved to be the true zenith of community service sentences for 
environmental white-collar criminals, producing two especially high-profile 
cases. The first was Wal-Mart, which plead guilty to six criminal counts of 
violating the Clean Water Act for illegally handling and disposing of 
hazardous materials at its retail stores across the United States. Wal-Mart was 
sentenced to pay a $40 million criminal fine, and an additional $20 million that 
will fund various community service projects, including opening a $6 million 
Retail Compliance Assistance Center that will help retail stores across the 
nation learn how to properly handle hazardous waste.122  
However, the largest and most significant sentence came in the BP Gulf of 
Mexico settlement. Not only was it the largest community service sentence in 
environmental enforcement history, but BP also paid the largest criminal fine 
of any kind in all of U.S. history: $4 billion, over three times larger than the 
next-largest criminal resolution ever paid.123 The resolution is structured so 
                                                                                                                     
 119 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Southern Union Company Is Penalized $18 
Million for Illegally Storing Mercury at a Rhode Island Site 1 (Oct. 2, 2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/October/09-enrd-1070.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/XT9N-AREE. 
 120 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Shipping Firm Sentenced to Pay $10 Million 
for Causing Cosco Busan Oil Spill and Coverup 1 (Feb. 19, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/February/10-enrd-168.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/435U-VDXU.  
 121 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Scotts Miracle-Gro Will Pay $12.5 Million in 
Criminal Fines and Civil Penalties for Violations of Criminal Pesticide Laws 2 (Sept. 7, 
2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/September/12-enrd-1088.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/Y7KT-88AZ. Scotts also paid civil penalties and performed 
additional service projects related to its civil liability. See id. 
 122 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Wal-Mart Pleads Guilty to Federal 
Environmental Crimes, Admits Civil Violations and Will Pay More than $81 Million 2 
(May 28, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/May/13-enrd-611.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/NE36-DNXA. Wal-Mart also pled guilty to violating the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act by failing to properly handle pesticides. 
Id. at 1. 
 123 The previous largest criminal resolution was $1.3 billion, paid by Pfizer in 2009 for 
off-label pharmaceutical marketing. See Reasons for Accepting Plea Agreement at 11 n.15, 
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that more than half of this recovery will fund projects to compensate those 
communities and ecosystems most directly harmed by the spill. As the 
government’s own press release explained:  
[A]pproximately $2.4 billion of the $4.0 billion criminal recovery is 
dedicated to acquiring, restoring, preserving and conserving—in consultation 
with appropriate state and other resource managers—the marine and coastal 
environments, ecosystems and bird and wildlife habitat in the Gulf of Mexico 
and bordering states harmed by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. This portion 
of the criminal recovery will also be directed to significant barrier island 
restoration and/or river diversion off the coast of Louisiana to further benefit 
and improve coastal wetlands affected by the oil spill. An additional $350 
million will be used to fund improved oil spill prevention and response 
efforts in the Gulf through research, development, education and training.124  
The money is going primarily to the National Fish and Wildlife 
Foundation, an independent, non-profit conservation group.125 An additional 
$350 million will go to the National Academy of Sciences for oil spill 
prevention, education, research, and training.126 These organizations are 
required under the court order to spend the monies on projects specifically 
related to the oil spill to the extent possible.127 These penalties are in addition 
to the required monitors, audits, training programs, and other internal reforms.  
Notice again the RJ themes in these environmental examples. The 
sentences directly repair the harm that resulted from the violation, thus 
restoring the victims. Through research and education, the broader causes of 
the harm are studied and addressed; the sentences work toward prevention not 
merely by imposing a fine that would deter other prospective violators, but by 
changing the environment that gave rise to the violation. To identify the most 
effective measures, the defendant consults members of the local community 
with particular expertise. 
Commentators have consistently noted the RJ themes of these sentences, 
and the ways in which they move substantially beyond deterrence-based 
approaches to more effectively remedy and prevent harms. The ABA 
                                                                                                                     
United States v. BP Exploration & Prod., Inc., No. 12-292 (E.D. La. Jan. 20. 2013), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/vns/docs/2013/01/2013-01-30-bp-exploration-
reasons-for-accepting-plea-agreement.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/T2L7-SA8X.  
 124 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, BP Exploration and Production Inc. 
Agrees to Plead Guilty to Felony Manslaughter, Environmental Crimes and Obstruction of 
Congress Surrounding Deepwater Horizon Incident (Nov. 15, 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/November/12-ag-1369.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/C4T4-B6MM.  
 125 Guilty Plea Agreement Exhibit B at 16, United States v. BP Exploration & Prod., 
Inc., No. 12-292 (E.D. La. Nov. 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa 
/resources/43320121115143613990027.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/TQ8G-73SA.  
 126 Id. 
 127 See Order at 16–19, United States v. BP Exploration & Prod., Inc., No. 12-292 
(E.D. La. Jan. 29, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/vns/docs/2013 
/01/2013-01-29-bp-exploration-order.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/D5H9-EBCB. 
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explained that these sentences are designed to “improve or repair relationships 
among all stakeholders (i.e., impacted communities, facilities, and 
government, at all levels) following the environmental violation.”128 More to 
the point, Michael L. Rustad, Thomas H. Koenig, and Erica R. Ferreira 
provide an extensive case-study analysis of the RJ themes of supplemental 
sentences, observing that they “creatively combine[] both deterrence-based 
punishment through . . . penalties and restorative justice principles in the form 
of mitigation projects . . . .”129 Notably, those authors suggest that “[o]ther 
regulatory agencies should consider adopting restorative justice insights in 
designing remedies” for other forms of white-collar crime.130  
This Article will shortly provide an outline for doing that very thing. But 
further context is necessary to understanding how and why these sentences are 
authorized under existing federal law. The following section explains how 
constitutional pressures have shaped the formation of the guidelines that would 
now apply to any such sentences. 
B. Authorization in the U.S. Constitution  
Congress and various federal agencies have argued for years about 
whether the U.S. Constitution permits an enforcement agency to unilaterally 
divert de facto criminal penalties to community service projects. Supplemental 
sentences walk a fine line between the Executive’s enforcement authority131 
                                                                                                                     
 128 NICHOLAS TARG & DAVID JUNG, Preface to PUB. LAW RESEARCH INST., 
SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS: A FIFTY STATE SURVEY WITH MODEL 
PRACTICES 3 (2007), available at http://gov.uchastings.edu/public-law/docs/plri/ABA 
HastingsSEPreport.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/HT5H-X9NL; see Dika Kuoh, 
Leveraging Enforcement to Enhance Community: The Use of Supplemental Environmental 
Projects to Promote Environmental Justice 3 (May 2013) (unpublished Masters thesis, 
Duke University), available at http://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/handle/10161/6849, 
archived at http://perma.cc/5H9Y-MF95. 
 129 Michael L. Rustad et al., Restorative Justice to Supplement Deterrence-Based 
Punishment: An Empirical Study and Theoretical Reconceptualization of the EPA’s Power 
Plant Enforcement Initiative, 2000‒2011, 65 OKLA. L. REV. 427, 428 (2013).  
 130 Id. 
 131 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. In Federalist 58, Madison wrote that  
“they [(Congress)], in a word, hold the purse . . . . This power over the purse may, in 
fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any 
constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a 
redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and salutary 
measure.”  
THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, at 284‒85 (James Madison) (Terrence Ball ed., 2003). So too did 
the Supreme Court hold that “no money can be paid out of the Treasury unless it has been 
appropriated by an act of Congress.” Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 
321 (1937) (citing Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. 272, 291 (1851)); see Robert C. Byrd, The 
Control of the Purse and the Line Item Veto Act, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 297, 297 (1998); 
Richard D. Rosen, Funding “Non-Traditional” Military Operations: The Alluring Myth of 
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and the congressional power of the purse.132 Seeking to protect its power from 
executive encroachment, Congress enacted the Miscellaneous Receipts Act 
(MRA),133 requiring that any money received “for the Government” from any 
source be deposited into the U.S. treasury.134 The MRA is “intended to 
preserve Congressional prerogatives to appropriate funds as provided for in the 
U.S. Constitution.”135 Sentencing policy must therefore allow the Executive 
Branch to exercise its settlement authority without encroaching upon 
Congress’s appropriation power. 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, various enforcement agencies—including 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission,136 the Nuclear Regulatory 
                                                                                                                     
a Presidential Power of the Purse, 155 MIL. L. REV. 1, 1 (1998); Kate Stith, Congress’ 
Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1349 (1988); see also Charles Tiefer, Controlling 
Federal Agencies by Claims on Their Appropriations? The Takings Bill and the Power of 
the Purse, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 501, 502 (1996). 
 132 The Judiciary Act of 1789 vests plenary authority over the legal affairs of the 
United States in the Attorney General, and Congress created the Attorney General’s 
statutory authority to conduct litigation on behalf of the United States when establishing 
the Department of Justice in 1870. Todd David Peterson, Protecting the Appropriations 
Power: Why Congress Should Care About Settlements at the Department of Justice, 2009 
BYU L. REV. 327, 342‒43. 
 133 Miscellaneous Receipts Act, Pub. L. No. 97-258, 96 Stat. 948 (1982) (codified as 
amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3302 (2012)). 
 134 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SENTENCING GUIDANCE IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROSECUTIONS, 
INCLUDING THE USE OF SUPPLEMENTAL SENTENCING MEASURES, DEVELOPED BY THE U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIVISION, 
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES SECTION IN CONSULTATION WITH THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES 
POLICY COMMITTEE B-11 (2000) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL SENTENCING GUIDANCE]. 
 135 Memorandum from Walker B. Smith, Dir., Office of Regulatory Enforcement, U.S. 
Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Reg’l Counsel, Reg’l Enforcement Div. Dirs., & Reg’l Media Div. 
Dirs. 2 (Oct. 31, 2002) [hereinafter Nexus Memo], available at http://www2.epa.gov 
/sites/production/files/documents/sepnexus-mem.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6D8M-
Z2VR.  
 136 In 1983, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) sought an opinion 
from the Government Accounting Office concerning its proposed policy of accepting a 
defendant’s promise to make a donation to an educational institution as all or part of a 
settlement agreement. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, B-210210, 1983 WL 
197623 (Comp. Gen. Sept. 14, 1983). The CFTC specifically wanted to know if achieving 
its educational goals through the proposed plan would violate the MRA. See id. In striking 
down the proposal, the Comptroller General held that the donations would effectively be 
penalties, which are subject to deposit into the Treasury under the MRA, and that the 
CFTC’s means of enforcement are “specifically defined” by Congress and that settlement 
authority should be “limited to statutorily authorized prosecutorial objectives: correction or 
termination of a condition or practice, punishment, and deterrence.” Id. The Comptroller 
General further took issue with the fact that a charged party would donate funds to “an 
educational institution that has no relationship to the violation and that has suffered no 
injury from the violation.” Id. In concluding that the CFTC must collect those penalties and 
deposit them into the Treasury in compliance with the MRA, the Comptroller General 
added, “[t]he Commission may not circumvent the receipt of a penalty to accomplish a 
separate objective.” Id. 
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Commission,137 and ultimately the Environmental Protection Agency138—
claimed the authority to use a portion of civil settlements to fund community 
service projects, with repeated pushback from the Comptroller General. Then 
in 1993, the Comptroller General finally acknowledged that the U.S. 
Constitution and the MRA may indeed authorize the funding of such projects 
under certain, carefully prescribed conditions.139 It explained that the 
Government’s 
discretionary authority to ‘compromise, or remit, with or without conditions,’ 
civil penalties . . . empowers it to adjust penalties to reflect the special 
circumstances of the violation or concessions exacted from the violator, but 
does not extend to remedies unrelated to the correction of the violation in 
question.140  
This “adjustment” of penalties to reflect the violator’s “concessions”—
provided those concessions are “related” to the violation—marked the birth of 
the supplemental sentence. The Comptroller General essentially conceded that 
such projects could actually fall within the Executive’s legitimate enforcement 
                                                                                                                     
 137 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 70 Comp. Gen. 17 (1990) (regarding the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s authority to mitigate civil penalties in exchange for 
contributions to nuclear safety research projects at universities and other nonprofit 
institutions). Under the Atomic Energy Act, the NRC is authorized to impose civil 
monetary penalties for violations of licensing requirements and to compromise, mitigate, or 
remit those penalties as well. See 42 U.S.C. § 2282(a) (2012). The Comptroller General 
applied a similar line of reasoning as in Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, B-210210, 
1983 WL 197623 (Comp. Gen. Sept. 14, 1983), in determining that the proposed 
alternative was not within the Commission’s congressionally delegated powers. U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 70 Comp. Gen. 17 (1990). The Commission’s discretion to 
impose monetary penalties, “like CFTC’s prosecutorial discretion, does not empower the 
NRC to impose punishments unrelated to prosecutorial objectives.” Id. The Comptroller 
General elaborated, “[u]nder NRC’s proposal, a violator would contribute funds to an 
institution that, in all likelihood, has no relationship to the violations and has suffered no 
injury from the violation.” Id. The Comptroller General again maintained that allowing an 
agency to impose punishments unrelated to prosecutorial objectives would allow that 
agency to circumvent the MRA. Id. This opinion also added that the proposal would violate 
the general rule against augmentation of appropriation. Id. 
 138 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, B-247155, 1992 WL 726317 (Comp. Gen. July 
7, 1992). The EPA contended that its power to compromise or remit civil penalties with or 
without conditions under section 205 of the Clean Air Act provided a legal basis for its 
practice of funding public awareness projects with civil penalties. The opinion rejected the 
EPA’s proposal, finding that using penalty money to fund such projects would violate the 
MRA in all the ways it had previously explained: where the proposed project was not 
designed to remedy and prevent the specific harms caused by the violation, it would violate 
congressional appropriations power generally and the MRA specifically. Id. 
 139 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, B-247155.2, 1993 WL 798227 (Comp. Gen. Mar. 1, 
1993).  
 140 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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authority and not run afoul of either Congress’s Article I power of the purse or 
the MRA.141  
Within two years, the EPA would translate the Comptroller General’s 
guidance into an Interim Revised Supplemental Environmental Projects 
Policy.142 This publication also introduced the catchy civil-side moniker of the 
Supplemental Environmental Project, or “SEP.” The EPA clarified these civil 
enforcement guidelines in 1998, when it promulgated its Final EPA 
Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy.143 The DOJ then translated these 
civil enforcement guidelines into criminal sentencing guidance in a 2000 DOJ 
memo.144 The 2000 guidelines would be rearticulated in a 2012 United States 
Attorneys’ Bulletin.145 And as far back as the mid-1990s, the EPA and DOJ 
were administering supplemental sentences with some frequency.146  
The DOJ has explained that in addition to the goals of deterrence and 
corporate compliance, supplemental sentencing measures can “more fully 
remedy the harm to the environment and the community caused by the 
violation . . . .”147 It articulates several guidelines that, if followed, can keep 
the sentence within executive authority. Notice again how readily they transfer 
to anti-bribery law specifically and extraterritorial white-collar crime 
generally. 
The first and most fundamental requirement, arising directly from the 
Government Accountability Office opinions, is the nexus requirement. “Nexus 
is the relationship between the violation and the proposed project[,]”148 and 
the purpose of the nexus is to ensure that any harm or threatened harm to 
victims or the environment is actually addressed.149 It further ensures that 
supplemental projects “do not run afoul of any Constitutional and statutory 
requirements” by circumventing congressional authority to allocate the monies 
of the U.S. treasury.150 The enforcement agencies have developed three 
circumstances in which the nexus may be satisfied: first, where the project is 
“designed to reduce the likelihood that similar violations will occur in the 
future”; second, where the project “reduces the adverse impact” of the 
violation; or third, where the project “reduces the overall risk” to the 
                                                                                                                     
 141 Id. 
 142 Final EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy Issued, 63 Fed. Reg. 
24,796 (May 5, 1998). 
 143 Id. 
 144 See ENVIRONMENTAL SENTENCING GUIDANCE, supra note 134, at A-1. 
 145 Dighe, supra note 116, at 104. 
 146 For examples of early supplemental sentences, see ENVIRONMENTAL SENTENCING 
GUIDANCE, supra note 134, at B-1 to B-20. 
 147 Id. at A-1. The measures can also “encourage more efficient environmental 
technologies and corporate management practices, leverage greater environmental and 
public health improvements, and advance important priorities like pollution prevention.” 
Id. 
 148 Id. at B-15 n.49. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Nexus Memo, supra note 135. 
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community affected by the violation.151 Notably, EPA Guidelines specifically 
mention that a nexus can exist even where the project “will involve activities 
outside of the United States.”152  
Secondly, and relatedly, the enforcement agencies cannot approve any 
project that supplements, or appears to supplement, either their own 
appropriations or the appropriations of another federal agency.153 This “anti -
augmentation principle” holds that an improper augmentation of 
appropriations occurs in any of three circumstances: (1) where a supplemental 
project helps to carry out a project for which the enforcement agencies or other 
agencies already have funding; (2) where the federal government is required 
by law to carry out the project; or (3) where the project is already in existence 
and already receives federal funding.154 For this reason, the supplemental 
project must specifically address the harm that resulted from the violation, 
and/or take new measures to prevent similar future harms. Ultimately, if there 
is a close relationship between the violation and the supplemental project, the 
enforcement agencies have the discretion to consider the cost of the project 
when calculating the overall settlement; “if there is no nexus, then the 
[agencies do] not have that discretion.”155 
Third, the defendant must retain full responsibility for completion of the 
project; it may not merely give a cash donation to an organization. A cash 
donation, absent responsibility for completion of a discrete project, would 
violate the MRA.156 Any trust fund created by a supplemental sentence must 
be managed by a non-federal entity—whether a charity, educational 
institution, public interest group, or other organization—that is chosen without 
favoritism or the appearance of favoritism.157 The trust fund should be 
managed by neutral third parties, or the money may be deposited in an escrow 
account and distributed at regular intervals until the project is completed. 
Federal officials may provide technical oversight to ensure that the project is 
                                                                                                                     
 151 Final EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy Issued, 63 Fed. Reg. 
24,796, 24,798 (May 5, 1998). 
 152 Id. 
 153 Nexus Memo, supra note 135, at 23; see also ENVIRONMENTAL SENTENCING 
GUIDANCE, supra note 134, at B-11. 
 154 Nexus Memo, supra note 135, at 2–3; see also Motor Coach Indus., Inc. v. Dole, 
725 F.2d 958, 964–65 (4th Cir. 1984); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 2 PRINCIPLES OF 
FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 6-162 to 6-163 (3d ed. 2004).  
 155 Nexus Memo, supra note 135, at 2. 
 156 Memorandum from John Peter Suarez, Assistant Adm’r, EPA Office of 
Enforcement & Compliance Assurance, to Regional Counsels et al. ¶ II.A. (Dec. 15, 2003), 
available at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/seps-thirdparties.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/GYN2-XW3F. This prohibition on cash donations was first 
articulated by the Office of Legal Counsel opinion concerning a Department of Interior 
proposal. Steuart Transp. Co., 4B Op. O.L.C. 684, 684 (1980).  
 157 See ENVIRONMENTAL SENTENCING GUIDANCE, supra note 134, at B-18 to B-19. 
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consistent with the sentence but may not actually manage the project or its 
funding.158  
The memos enumerate various permitted sentencing objectives: 
remediation and restoration (taking steps to restore and enhance the 
environment near the site of the violation); prevention (beyond what is already 
required by federal environmental law, with the aim of developing innovative 
new processes); restitution payments to local agencies for their remediation 
costs; setting up trust funds for the long-term monitoring, restoration, and 
preservation of the resources impacted by the violation; environmental 
education (in the form of formal educational programs, regulatory training, 
and speeches to trade groups); and public apologies (in newspapers and other 
public media).159 Projects that have violated one or more of these guidelines 
include: general educational or public environmental awareness projects, e.g., 
conducting tours of an environmental facility or promoting recycling; 
contributions to research at a college or university; conducting a project of 
benefit to the harmed community, but unrelated to environmental protection, 
e.g., making a charitable organization or donating playground equipment; and 
studies or assessments that do not address the problems they identify. 
Note that these guidelines are in no way specific to environmental 
violations. The constitutional context bears this out; so too do the federal 
sentencing guidelines themselves. The next section describes how the 
guidelines now authorize supplemental sentences, and in a way that is fully 
transferable to other areas of enforcement. 
C. Authorization in the Sentencing Guidelines 
The DOJ could immediately adopt the supplemental sentence in 
extraterritorial white-collar enforcement. It now lies within the agency’s 
prosecutorial discretion because it is authorized under existing federal law. But 
                                                                                                                     
 158 Id. Additionally, the defendant may not obtain tax relief for the value of the 
supplemental sentence if the same funds were used to pay a fine. Id. The principle 
difference between civil and criminal supplemental environmental sentences concerns the 
relationship between the cost of the supplemental project and the monetary fine. On the 
civil side, the EPA has worked a complex and highly specific five-step procedure for 
determining the settlement amount without a supplemental project, the cost of the project, 
and the extent of penalty mitigation. See id. Generally speaking, the mitigation should not 
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the statutory authority for the supplemental sentence does not derive from the 
environmental statutes or from some kind of specialized amendment to federal 
sentencing law. Rather, it derives from the standard sentencing sources: the 
Sentencing Reform Act and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.  
This subsection will first describe how the guidelines authorize these 
supplemental sentences. It shows that RJ is actually embedded in the very 
structure of the guidelines, though in nascent form. It then describes how the 
supplemental sentence could be adapted to extraterritorial white-collar crime 
without any new legal authorization. 
Chapter 8 of the Sentencing Guidelines Manual provides a distinct set of 
procedures for the sentencing of organizational defendants. The prosecutor (in 
a case settled out of court, as anti-bribery cases virtually always are)160 first 
determines the offense level based in part on the value of the benefit received 
and, consulting a chart in the Guidelines, calculates the base fine.161 She then 
determines a culpability score, which takes into account the size of the 
organization, the level of personnel involved in the crime, and the extent of the 
organization’s cooperation and acceptance of responsibility.162 This 
culpability score produces two “multipliers,” a maximum and a minimum.163 
The base fine, multiplied by each of the multipliers, then produces a fine 
range.164 
But the Guidelines then permit the prosecutor to set an ultimate fine that is 
below the sentencing range; this is known as a “downward departure,” and is 
permitted for either of two reasons. The first is assistance to the enforcement 
authorities in the investigation or prosecution of another person, whether an 
organization or an individual (not affiliated with the defendant).165 The second 
reason, which is particularly germane to the present inquiry, is remedial costs 
arising from the offense.166  
Two examples can illustrate how the DOJ specifically applies these 
provisions to extraterritorial white-collar enforcement, again using anti-bribery 
law as an example. Bizjet, a U.S.-based company that provides aircraft 
maintenance services to customers around the world, admitted to bribing 
government officials in Mexico and Panama to win and retain business.167 The 
DOJ calculated the offense level, considering the base offense and the value of 
                                                                                                                     
 160 See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 85, at 74–77 (explaining the government’s 
various methods of settling cases without going to trial). 
 161 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 8, §§ 8C2.3–2.4. 
 162 Id. § 8C2.5. 
 163 Id. § 8C2.6. 
 164 Id. § 8C2.7. 
 165 Id. § 8C4.1. 
 166 Id. § 8C4.9. 
 167 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 1‒2, United States v. Bizjet Int’l Sales & 
Support, Inc., No. 12-CR-61-CVE (N.D. Okla. Mar. 14, 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/bizjet/2012-03-14-bizjet-deferred-
prosecution-agreement.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/W5YZ-2V58. 
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the benefit, producing a base fine of $28.5 million.168 The culpability score 
was then determined based on a base score, the size of the organization, and its 
voluntary disclosure and cooperation.169 The culpability score then produced 
two multipliers, one high and one low.170 The base fine, multiplied by the 
culpability multipliers, produced a sentence range of $17.1 million to $34.2 
million.171 However, the ultimate fine was $11.8 million, a 30% reduction off 
the bottom of the range.172 This reduction was appropriate given, inter alia, 
Bizjet’s “extensive” remediation.173 The remediation included implementation 
of a corporate compliance program, a review of its internal controls, and 
periodic reports to the DOJ.174  
Biomet, a U.S.-based company that manufactured and sold orthopedic 
devices, used its subsidiaries in Argentina, Brazil, China, and Sweden to bribe 
doctors. Because these doctors were employees of state-owned hospitals, the 
DOJ treated the doctors as “foreign officials.”175 Per the Guidelines, the DOJ 
calculated the base offense, considering the base offense level, the number of 
bribes, the value of the benefit, and Bizjet’s “substantial assistance in the 
prosecution of others,” rendering a base fine of $13.5 million. It then 
calculated the culpability score based on a base score, the size of the 
organization, and Biomet’s full cooperation and acceptance of responsibility, 
again producing two multipliers. The base fine multiplied by the culpability 
multipliers rendered a fine range of $21.6 million to $43.2 million. However, 
as with Biomet, the ultimate sentence was $17.28 million, a 20% reduction of 
the bottom of the range. This reduction was “appropriate” due in large part to 
Bizjet’s “extraordinary remediation.”176 That remediation included the 
implementation of a corporate compliance program, the engagement of an 
independent corporate compliance monitor, and periodic compliance reporting 
to the DOJ. 
These anti-bribery examples show that the DOJ already grants downward 
departures from the sentencing range for remediation. However, they also 
show that the allowed remediation has historically been limited to compliance 
programs, monitors, and reporting. Nevertheless, the Guidelines also allow 
remediation to include programs funded by the defendant that address the 
harms that the violation caused. The Guidelines describe these non-monetary 
penalties (the compliance programs, monitors, reporting requirements, etc.) as 
“conditions of probation.”177 They permit these conditions of probation in a 
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 173 Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 167, at 3‒7. 
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 175 See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 85, at 19–21. 
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number of circumstances, two of which are particularly relevant here: where it 
is “necessary to ensure that changes are made within the organization to 
reduce the likelihood of future criminal conduct,”178 and to “ensure 
completion of community service.”179 The remediation that the DOJ already 
requires—compliance programs, monitors, etc.—falls into the first category: it 
is necessary to ensure changes within the organization. 
The supplemental sentence falls within the second category of probation: 
community service. Probationary sentences directed to community service 
derive their authority from the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which 
restructured federal sentencing and established the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission.180 That statute authorizes the court, as a discretionary condition 
of probation, to order the defendant to “work in community service.”181 The 
legislative history explains that community service may be “useful” where the 
victims “cannot be readily identified.”182 This is of course frequently true in 
environmental law and virtually always true in anti-bribery law: the victims 
can be a very broad group of individuals. Like the Sentencing Reform Act, the 
Guidelines provide that where the victims are not identifiable an “order of 
probation requiring community service” is appropriate.183 This community 
service should be designed “to reduce or eliminate the harm threatened, or to 
repair the harm caused by the offense, when that harm or threatened harm 
would not otherwise be remedied.”184 Community service then can, or must, 
both remedy past harm and prevent future harm.185 
The supplemental sentence would thus easily fit into existing FCPA 
sentencing procedures. Following standard procedure, the DOJ would 
                                                                                                                     
 178 Id. § 8D1.1(a)(6). 
 179 Id. § 8D1.1(a)(1). 
 180 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.). 
 181 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(12) (2012). 
 182 ENVIRONMENTAL SENTENCING GUIDANCE, supra note 134, at B-1. 
 183 The very first policy statement of the “Sentencing of Organizations” chapter of the 
Guidelines provides that “the court must, whenever practicable, order the organization to 
remedy any harm caused by the offense.” U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 8, ch. 8, 
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Guidelines to “support[] the concept that supplemental sentences are important and 
appropriate.” ENVIRONMENTAL SENTENCING GUIDANCE, supra note 134, at B-5.  
 184 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 8, § 8B1, introductory cmt. 
 185 Moreover, the community service is required to “provide[] a means for preventive 
or corrective action directly related to the offense and therefore serve[s] one of the 
purposes of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id. § 8B1.3, cmt. And those 
purposes extend well beyond deterrence: in addition to providing “adequate deterrence,” 
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calculate the base fine and the culpability multipliers, and set a fine range. It 
would then consider whether to grant a downward departure. It might grant a 
departure based on the already familiar terms of probation: compliance 
programs, internal control improvements, outside corporate monitor, and the 
submission of periodic reports to the DOJ. But in addition to these forms of 
remediation, it would grant a further condition of probation—say an increase 
from a 20% to a 30% departure—for the defendant’s community service 
projects. 
The projects would fully comport with the DOJ’s already existing 
Guidelines for complying with the MRA. Accordingly, the Guidelines would 
have a nexus to the violation, would not augment a project that is already 
receiving federal funding, and the government would play no part in managing 
the project or its funding.186 
Following the Guidelines and the environmental precedents, the projects 
could take a couple different forms. Focusing on prevention through 
education, the defendant could fund a variety of training programs. These 
programs would need to be specifically designed to prevent the conduct that 
gave rise to the violation. They might focus on trade groups, government 
officials, or business- and law-school students. The defendant might even 
establish a training center that provided certification in anti-corruption 
compliance, as recently occurred in environmental enforcement. The training 
must be specifically designed to prevent the specific harms that the 
defendant’s violation had caused, must occur in the communities where the 
violation occurred, and must be funded and managed entirely by the defendant 
(or a third party).187 
The projects might also seek to correct the harm that resulted from the 
violation, or prevent similar harm in the future.188 In the corruption space, 
correcting past harms will sometimes prove impossible; in this regard, FCPA 
violations are essentially different from environmental violations. However, an 
FCPA defendant would seem uniquely positioned to identify preventative 
measures that could reduce future harms. This need not be limited to training 
programs. With the financial support made possible by the supplemental 
sentence, the defendant could work in conjunction with outside experts 
(NGOs, consultants, or academics) to write a detailed report. The report could 
identify the conditions in the host country that gave rise to the violation and 
develop a series of innovative reforms that would have prevented the violation. 
These reforms might involve corporate governance, host-country governance, 
investigative reporting, or enforcement among capital-exporters. They might 
include the development of enforceable agreements or pacts among competitor 
companies, the funding of other private-sector initiatives, or more formal legal 
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reforms. The defendant, likely working through a third party, could then 
undertake a sustained and well-funded effort to implement the reforms. 
The following section shows how this idea could work out in a specific 
(though hypothetical) enforcement action. It explains how a supplemental 
sentence, based on the policies and aims of restorative justice, would comply 
with the U.S. Constitution, the Miscellaneous Receipts Act, and the 
Guidelines.  
D. A New Proposal 
This Article has exposed a fundamental paradox, if not a riddle, of 
extraterritorial white-collar enforcement: we must reach the unreachable, 
punish the unpunishable, alter the conduct of whole categories of persons who 
lie beyond our jurisdiction. This riddle exists because deterrence-based 
enforcement leads to increased levels of host-country bribery. Limited to a 
one-dimensional focus on manipulating the incentives of those corporate 
actors subject to its jurisdiction, it creates the conditions in which the criminal 
conduct of other actors may proliferate. To resolve the paradox, or solve the 
riddle, criminal punishment must impact, to the extent possible, the behavior 
of foreign corporations and host-country government officials. The enforcing 
jurisdiction cannot and will not eliminate criminal conduct by those actors; but 
it can and should aspire to ensure that its own enforcement efforts do not make 
the problem worse.  
Restorative justice, as applied to multinational corporations, can resolve 
the riddle in the following way. Imagine a multinational corporation (MNC) 
with jurisdictional ties to the United States has allegedly committed several 
FCPA violations in a particular developing country.189 To wit, in seeking to 
gain government approval to enter this market, the MNC flew key officials 
(and not their spouses) to a lavish offshore location where it hosted several 
days of “preliminary negotiations.”190 During the visit, the MNC provide 
expensive gifts—cognac, designer clothing, and luxury box tickets to a high-
profile sporting event—to each of these officials.191 Finally, the MNC 
provided jobs to younger relatives of several of the officials. Once these high-
ranking officials approved the MNC’s market entry, the MNC then needed to 
build a number of facilities and sought the cooperation of local officials. It 
hired a local attorney who specialized in obtaining government approvals.192 
That attorney coordinated the bribing of various local officials to obtain 
building permits where the zoning regulations otherwise prohibited 
                                                                                                                     
 189 See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 85, at 11–12 (explaining the FCPA’s 
jurisdictional provisions). 
 190 Id. at 24 (discussing “reasonable and bona fide expenditures”). 
 191 See id. 
 192 See id. at 21–23 (discussing third parties). 
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commercial property. So too did the local attorney bribe building inspectors to 
permit cost-cutting construction measures that violated safety codes.  
Once the allegations arose, the MNC followed the standard practice of 
retaining an outside law firm to conduct an independent investigation and 
prepared a report detailing its factual findings.193 To receive cooperation 
credit,194 the MNC fully cooperated with the DOJ including voluntarily 
disclosing the investigation report. The defendant enters into a deferred 
prosecution agreement that stipulates to a number of facts and provides a 
sentencing range based on the Guidelines’ procedures. Imagine that the base 
fine is $50 million, and the sentencing range is $35 million to $65 million. 
But the DOJ grants a 30% downward departure—as it has already shown 
itself willing to do195—and requires the defendant to pay a fine of only $24.5 
million. This downward departure is appropriate because the defendant has 
agreed to a number of remedial conditions of probation: it has adopted various 
internal controls, instituted a rigorous compliance program, and accepted an 
independent corporate monitor.196 Additionally, the MNC has volunteered to 
fund a series of community service projects. These projects will be designed to 
help the particular local communities where the bribes occurred.197  
To design the projects, the MNC consulted various representatives of 
those communities: civic leaders, NGOs, and local businesses. In these 
consultations, the MNC sought to more fully understand how its conduct 
impacted the community, which specific harms it caused, the extent to which 
those harms can now be remedied, and how to prevent similar harms in the 
future. The MNC also came to more fully understand the local cultural norms 
surrounding corruption, and discovered that its conduct, which violated the 
FCPA, fell into three categories: the locals perceived some of the MNC’s 
conduct as highly unusual and offensive (the lavish business trip, for 
example); some was perceived as quite common, but still offensive (bribing 
the local officials to violate safety and zoning regulations); and yet some of the 
conduct was quite common and not particularly offensive (the cognac, clothes, 
and tickets, for example). The MNC then used this feedback to determine 
which forms of corruption it should try to remedy and prevent. That is, the 
local community’s definition of corruption, and not the U.S. enforcement 
agencies’, guides the project. 
In consultation with internationally recognized anti-corruption experts, the 
MNC develops three specific projects, proposing a specific timeline and cost 
for each. The defendant agrees to completely finance the project and manage 
                                                                                                                     
 193 See id. at 52–56 for an introduction to enforcement procedures. 
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the payment. So too does the defendant assume full responsibility for 
completing the project, likely through hiring a third party, and remains liable 
for its non-completion. The cost of the proposed community service projects 
then forms the basis of the additional downward departure: the defendant’s 
fine is reduced by a percentage of the projects’ cost, as determined by the 
prosecutor in her discretion. 
The first such project is a small business-loan program for any merchants 
who can demonstrate that their local business materially suffered as a result of 
the MNC’s bribes. This proposal is designed to remedy certain of the harms 
that the defendant’s conduct caused in disrupting local markets. The second 
project is a training center for local businesses, attorneys, and government 
officials, which offers training on how to conduct business with outside 
companies without drawing them into violation of extraterritorial anti-bribery 
laws. The center provides a certification that its graduates use to represent to 
foreign companies that they were well versed in the prevention of bribery 
violations.  
Third, the MNC agrees to write a comprehensive report on its experience 
of paying bribes in that country.198 The report would concede no further facts 
than were already made public in the deferred prosecution agreement (DPA). 
Based only on those facts, the report would describe in detail which bribes the 
MNC paid, and more importantly, why. It would further describe what the 
MNC discovered about the adverse impact of their conduct on the local 
community. And unlike the deferred prosecution agreement, the report would 
then be translated into the local language and systematically publicized across 
the local media.  
This report would serve two purposes. First, it would be a sort of public 
confession, written in the tone of a mea culpa. The MNC would admit to its 
illicit payments (as it already has in the DPA) and acknowledge the harm that 
these bribes caused in the local community. 
But in the course of this confession, the report would also describe the 
conditions in which the MNC felt the bribes were necessary. It would allude 
to, if not outright detail, the behavior of our two other sets of actors. The first 
would be the local government officials. The report would indicate where 
bribes were reasonably thought necessary to obtain the government’s approval, 
either because the official committed outright extortion or because he simply 
refused to do his job otherwise. Second, the report could also explain the 
conduct of local and foreign competitor companies. These competitors might 
be paying bribes to obtain an advantage, such that the defendant felt it could 
not compete without doing the same, or the local competitors might routinely 
engage in this conduct, and the government either does not care and expected 
                                                                                                                     
 198 One of the “Recommended Conditions of Probation” in the Sentencing Guidelines 
Manual is that the organization “at its expense” and in a specified “format and media” may 
“publicize the nature of the offense committed, the fact of conviction, the nature of the 
punishment imposed, and the steps that will be taken to prevent the recurrence of similar 
offenses.” Id. § 8D1.4(a). 
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it or even demanded the same. The mea culpa, then, would simultaneously 
expose the extent of the problem that existed prior to the defendant’s 
investment in that market.  
The defendant MNC would design a plan to publicize this report in two 
ways. First, and as indicated above, it would distribute the report across the 
local media. Second, it would deliver the report to various international 
organizations, particularly those charged with overseeing the implementation 
of the various anti-corruption agreements: the United Nations Office of Drugs 
and Crime (custodian of the UN Convention Against Corruption)199 and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (custodian of the 
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials),200 as 
well as the major relevant NGOs such as Transparency International.201  
This report, thus publicized, and in combination with the training facility, 
would begin to improve the host-country conditions that precipitate bribery in 
several ways. First, host-country officials would be educated in bribery-
reduction strategies.  
This training would help, but of course these officials have material 
incentives to continue accepting bribes. Where education and good will cannot 
reduce the problem, the report steps in, and provides the second mechanism 
for improving host-country conditions. In publicizing the company’s report of 
systemic bribery across the local and national media, local political pressures 
are exerted on the government to effect reforms; consider Brazil or China as 
powerful recent examples of this phenomenon.202  
Third, in the hands of international organizations, the report can trigger the 
levers of international diplomacy, exerting pressure on two kinds of countries. 
Of course, where the host country has proven to be systemically complicit in 
international bribery schemes, organizations will pressure the country to more 
meaningfully enforce domestic bribery prohibitions. But so too will these 
levers be brought to bear on the other capital-exporting nations whose 
companies are participating in the host-country’s bribery. That is, the non-
enforcing capital-exporting jurisdictions, whose companies pay bribes 
overseas without fear of punishment, can be pressured to enact and enforce 
extraterritorial bribery prohibitions. This is the story of the OECD’s Anti-
Bribery Convention, in which recent years have shown a steady increase in 
enforcement by member nations largely in response to the pressure of fellow 
members. Germany, for example, which once publicly mocked the United 
States for enacting the FCPA, has now become among the OECD’s leading 
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enforcers of its similar law.203 Through these levers, those companies that 
were once substitute investors now become reluctant bribe payers. As the 
number of jurisdictions enforcing an extraterritorial prohibition increases, and 
the number of reluctant MNC bribe payers increases, rates of host-country 
bribery decline. 
Admittedly, these methods would only make a minor dent in the 
prevalence of host-country bribery. They would constitute but a small part of a 
much larger and more complex strategy for reducing such bribery. But recall 
our aim:204 to reduce host-country bribery by somewhere between 4–11%. 
Were that mark achieved, the enforcing country would have accomplished its 
goal: to enforce an extraterritorial prohibition that actually improved the social 
conditions of both the actual and prospective victims of multinational 
corporate crime. 
This accomplishment, at once modest and transformative, is made possible 
by the uniquely three-dimensional approach of restorative justice.205 The 
defendant does not merely pay a fine; it is forced to confront the victims of its 
crime. Through the consultations with community leaders, the MNC is 
confronted by, and listens to, the victims (and their representatives).206 In then 
deliberately broadcasting across the local media an admission of its guilt, the 
MNC admits to its wrongdoing and acknowledges the harm it caused. 
Perpetrator and victim thus hear each other’s narratives, seeking understanding 
and reconciliation.207 The defendant then voluntarily participates in the 
sentencing by designing community service projects and taking full 
responsibility for their cost and completion.208 The community has thus 
achieved a fuller understanding of its past, and its future, and the norm 
transgression is affirmed.209 
The victims are restored both through remediation (such as the loan 
program) and prevention (the training center and the political pressure to 
implement reforms). The victim becomes empowered: its own account of the 
crimes committed and the harms caused, informed by the community’s own 
cultural norms and social experience, forms the basis of the sentence. To the 
extent that the defendant has thus repaired its reputation and restored a 
measure of good will in the community, it can resume its business practices. 
Now compliant with anti-bribery laws, it reintegrates into the very community 
it once knowingly victimized and repairs the social processes it once damaged.  
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However, the defendant’s overall financial penalty is no less than a 
traditional fine, and can actually be greater: the defendant’s fine reduction may 
be less than the full cost of the projects, as determined in the prosecutor’s 
discretion. The good will benefits to the corporation thus do not render the 
sentence’s deterrent value lower than a conventional fine.210 Moreover, care 
will be taken to ensure that the defendant corporation does not benefit in any 
illicit way from the project; the project will likely be managed in large part by 
a neutral third party, and the defendant may be required to submit periodic 
reports to the DOJ. The corporation and the third party can likewise manage 
the project with sufficient care to ensure that the host country’s government or 
third parties do not embezzle the money. The corporation will use its ample 
resources to monitor the project and ensure that the money never passes into 
any government official’s hands, whether in the United States or the host 
country. 
This proposal is not without its drawbacks. The possibility that these anti-
corruption measures could become corrupted is of course omnipresent. Some 
may argue that any gains from these projects will be offset by the loss in 
revenue to the U.S. treasury. And yet others may simply maintain that the 
United States has historically concerned itself too much, and not too little, with 
“reforming” countries in transition. Finally, some will note that crime is a vast, 
complex, and deeply-entrenched problem which the developed world’s efforts, 
no matter how innovative and well-meaning, cannot solve. 
The latter point, at least, is certainly true. We will not eliminate bribery, or 
corporate crime, whether overseas or within our own jurisdictions. Nor will we 
eliminate murder; but this is hardly an argument against its prohibition. The 
proposal developed here has a much more modest goal: to ensure that our 
efforts to reduce overseas crime make the situation incrementally better or, at 
very least, do not make the problem worse.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Two recent U.S. Supreme Court cases famously restricted laws that (once) 
governed overseas corporate conduct: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.211 
(concerning the Alien Tort Statute), and Morrison v. National Australian Bank 
Ltd.212 (concerning Section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). But 
rumors of the death of extraterritorial application are greatly exaggerated. 
Federal law continues to govern—legitimately—U.S. corporations overseas in 
such diverse areas as employment discrimination,213 antitrust,214 trade and 
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economic sanctions,215 money laundering,216 and of course, bribery.217 
Supreme Court jurisprudence notwithstanding, Congress’s constitutional 
authority to regulate foreign commerce is indeed alive and well.218 
And we should expect Congress to exercise that authority with increasing, 
rather than decreasing frequency, as U.S. companies increasingly invest in 
foreign markets. Where those markets’ legal regimes remain nascent, the 
capital-exporting country bears a substantial burden. Whether foreign 
investment in developing countries inures to the latter’s good, or ill, depends 
in large measure on the careful enforcement of extraterritorial corporate 
criminal law. 
This Article sounds a note both cautious and optimistic. Familiar modes of 
criminal punishment—general deterrence guided by the utility calculations and 
incentive adjustments of law and economics—will not carry the day. In any 
area of corporate conduct that host countries and other capital exporters fail to 
effectively regulate, our own deterrence efforts will frequently make matters 
worse. But the solution, perhaps surprisingly, has been there all along. 
Restorative justice provides an alternative paradigm of criminal punishment 
with already well-established authorization under the U.S. Constitution, the 
Guidelines, and a decades-old DOJ practice. It could restore overseas victims 
through both remediation and prevention, and would help ensure that our 
foreign investment promotes, rather than impedes, the growth of sustainable 
institutions. The remedy this Article proposes is thus already completely legal 
under federal law. It requires no more for its immediate adoption than our 
government’s informed resolve. 
                                                                                                                     
against territoriality to hold that Title VII did not so apply. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 
499 U.S. 244 (1991). That same year, Congress responded by amending both Title VII and 
the ADA to expressly apply extraterritorially. See Spalding, The Irony, supra note 12, at 
383–85. 
 214 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2012). 
 215 The two principal statutes are the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 
Pub. L. No. 95–223, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1707, and the Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 
App. U.S.C.A. §§ 1–39, 41–44 (West 2014). 
 216 Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–1957 (2012); Bank 
Secrecy Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 1951‒1959, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5314, 5316‒5332 (2012). 
 217 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA), Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494, 
amended by Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 
Stat. 1107 and by International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. 
No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
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